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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appellants originally brought this appeal before the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
78-2-2(3) (i), as the Judgment appealed from is one over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. Pursuant to the 
authority vested in the Supreme Court, this appeal was transferred to this 
Court for disposition on July 8, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINSS 
This is an appeal from a Judgment entered on April 1, 1987, by 
the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, following a bench trial before the 
Honorable David B. Dee, District Court Judge, on January 6 - 8 , 1985. 
SUMMARY OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did Appellants, as the result of the transactions between 
them and Respondents Edwards during May, 1981, waive their right to receive 
the $ 1 8 , 1 7 5 . 0 0 e q u i t y balance payment due under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract between the parties? 
2. Was Respondents-Edwards1 f a i l u r e t o pay Appellants the 
$ 1 8 , 1 7 5 . 0 0 e q u i t y ba lance in accordance with the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract as modi f ied by the parties, a material breach of said Contract, 
ent i t l ing Appellants to their damages resulting thereform? 
3. Did Respondents-Edwards waive any defense to Appellants1 
Complaint based upon the statute of frauds as the result of their failure 
to plead said affirmative defense in their Answer to Appellants' Complaint? 
4. Was the uns igned Extens ion Agreement of May 20, 1981, 
e n f o r c e a b l e notwithstanding the statute of frauds, under the doctrine of 
part performance? 
5. Are Respondents-Edwards l i a b l e t o Appellants for waste 
committed t o A p p e l l a n t s ' property pursuant to the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract between the parties? 
6. Are Respondents-Barker , a s l i c e n s e e s on A p p e l l a n t s ' 
property, l iable to Appellants for waste? 
7. I f Respondents-Edwards and Barker are l iable for waste, what 
i s the proper measure of damages? 
8. Did Respondent Davis, by misrepresenting to Appellants the 
terms of the Extension Agreement of May 20, 1981, fa i l ing to disclose to 
A p p e l l a n t s the fu l l extent of his financial dealings with the Edwards, and 
f a i l i n g t o s ecure the removal of the Barkers frcm the premises following 
Appellants' demands therefore, violate his fiduciary duty to Appellants? 
9. Did Respondent Davis fraudulently misrepresent the terms of 
the Extension Agreement of May 20, 1981, to Appellants? 
STATEMENT OF THE C&SE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by Appellants against Respondents Joel 
and LaWanna F. Edwards for breach of a Uniform Real Estate Contract, waste 
and fraud, Hal D. and Myrna Barker for waste, and Sid Davis and Jo Vance 
Casper for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellants f i led this action with the Clerk of the Third Judicial 
D i s t r i c t Court of S a l t Lake County, State of Utah. Respondents Edwards 
f i l e d a Counterclaim against Appellants, a Counterclaim against the Barkers 
and a Cross-Claim a g a i n s t Davis and Casper. Respondents Barker f i led a 
Counterclaim a g a i n s t A p p e l l a n t s and Cross-Claims against Respondents 
Edwards, Davis and Casper. Respondents Davis and Casper f i l e d a 
Counterclaim against Appellants. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Fol lowing a bench t r i a l , the t r i a l court issued a Memorandum 
D e c i s i o n (a copy of which i s included as "Efchibit A" in the Addendum). 
T h e r e a f t e r , Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were issued ("Exhibit 
B" in the Addendum) , and Judgment was entered dismissing Appellants' 
Complaint, and Respondents' various Counterclaims and Cross-Claims with 
prejudice, each of the parties to bear their own costs and attorney's fees . 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants were the owners of a heme and real property located at 
3275 South 4300 West, West Valley City, Utah, which they had purchased new 
in approximately 1976 (Transcript, Vol. I , Pages 6-7). At the time of the 
e v e n t s which are the s u b j e c t matter of this action, Appellants owed a 
mortgage on the home t o Prudential Federal Savings, having a balance of 
approximate ly $ 2 7 f 0 0 0 . 0 0 (T. Vo l . I , P. 7 ) . Monthly payments on the 
mortgage were $287.00 per month; there were no other l iens or encuitfcrances 
against the property (T. Vol. I f P. 7 ) . 
Due t o Appellant Theodore Salazar's declining health, Appellants 
dec ided t o s e l l the hone and move to a warmer climate (T. Vol. I , P. 120). 
They were approached by Respondent Sid Davis, a real estate salesman 
l i c e n s e d by the State of Utah Department of Business Regulations (T. Vol. 
I , P. 9 , and Vol . I I f Pg. 68-70), to l i s t their home with him. Davis was 
employed by Respondent Jo Vance Casper d/b/a Century 21-Casper & Company, a 
r e a l e s t a t e brokerage firm also licensed by the State of Utah (T. Vol. I I , 
P. 6 8 ) . I t i s admit ted t h a t by h i s a c t i o n s , Respondent Davis bound 
Respondent Casper as his principal (T. Vol. I I , Pg. 69-70). 
The p a r t i e s en tered i n t o a Lis t ing Agreement for the sale of 
A p p e l l a n t s 1 home ("Exhib i t C" in the Addendum, and Appellants1 t r ia l 
E x h i b i t No. 1) , which was prepared by Respondent Davis following his 
i n s p e c t i o n of the p r o p e r t y . As s e t f o r t h i n the Listing Agreement, 
Respondent Davis found the home "wsll kept," and that i t nshow(ed) very 
w e l l . " The l i s t i n g p r i c e was $ 5 9 , 9 0 0 . 0 0 . At the t ime of l i s t i n g , 
A p p e l l a n t s r e t a i n e d Respondent Davis as t h e i r agent, and reasonably 
b e l i e v e d he would make every effort to s e l l their home, get them a good 
d e a l and be honest, trustworthy and reliable in his dealings (T. Vol. I , P. 
10) . A p p e l l a n t s reasonably believed that Respondent Casper, as broker, 
cwed them the same duties (T. Vol. I , P. 10). 
In May, 1980 , Respondent Davis presented Appellants with an 
Earnest Money Rece ip t and Offer t o Purchase from Respondents Joel and 
LaWanna Edwards. After negotiations/ the parties entered into a Uniform 
Real E s t a t e Contract/ which was prepared by Respondent Davis ("Exhibit D" 
in the Addendum/ and Appellants1 t r ia l Exhibit No. 3 ) . 
The Contract purchase pr ice was $59/900.00. The Edwards paid 
$ 4 / 5 0 0 . 0 0 downr and agreed t o pay the $287.00 monthly payments on the 
Prudent ia l Federal Savings mortgage unti l June 1/ 1981 (T. Vol. I, P. 25). 
At t h a t t i m e , the Edwards were to pay Appellants their $28/175.00 equity 
i n t e r e s t in the home through re-financing or assumption of the existing 
Prudent ia l loan (T. Vo l . I, P. 25). The Contract further provided that 
upon d e f a u l t / the Edwards were to pay a l l costs and expenses/ including a 
reasonab le at torney's fee f which might arise from enforcing the agreement 
(T. Vol. 11/ P. 29) . The Contract also provided that the Edwards would not 
commit nor s u f f e r t o be cotmitted any waste, spoil / or destruction in or 
upon the p r o p e r t y , and t h a t they would maintain the premises in good 
condit ion (T. Vol. I I , P. 28). Appellants received only $1/000.00 frcm the 
down payment/ the $3 /500 .00 balance being paid to Respondents Davis and 
Casper as a sales commission (Plaintiffs1 t r ia l Exhibit No. 4 ) . 
Af ter the c l o s i n g of the Contract/ Respondent Davis1 dealings 
wi th the Edwards continued. In mid-Septemberf 1980/ the Edwards received 
approximate ly $7/500.00 from the sale of a heme in Idaho (T. Vol. I I f P. 
15) . Respondent Davis advised them not to pay the money to the Appellants/ 
but i n v e s t i t in some second t r u s t deeds (T. Vo l . 1 1 / P. 15-16) . 
Respondent Davis assured the Edwards that the investments were safe. (T. 
Vo l . I l l / Pg. 21-23). Based upon Respondent Davis' respresentations/ the 
Edwards purchased three (3) second trust deedsf including one which they 
co-purchased with Respondent Davis (T. Vol. I I f P. 19; Vol. I l l / P. 21). 
Thereafter, in March, 1981
 f the Edwards retained Respondent Davis 
as t h e i r agent t o s e l l Appellants' home (T. Vol. I I , P. 65). Appellants 
mainta in they were never informed of the Edwards/Davis l i s t ing agreement 
(T. V o l . I , P. 29) ; Respondent Davis maintains he informed Plaintiffs of 
the same (T. Vol. I l l , P. 25) . 
T h e r e a f t e r , during May, 1 9 8 1 , Respondent Davis contacted 
A p p e l l a n t s and informed them t h a t the Edwards could not pay the fu l l 
$ 2 8 , 1 7 5 . 0 0 equi ty payment due under the Contract on June 1, 1981 (T. Vol. 
I l l , P. 22) . Respondent Davis did not inform Appellants of his second 
trust deed dealings with the Edwards (T. Vol. I , P. 29) . 
However, Respondent Davis did represent to Appellants that the 
the transact ion could be modified so that the Edwards would pay Appellants 
t h e i r $ 2 8 , 1 7 5 . 0 0 e q u i t y over a l i t t l e more time. Davis represented to 
A p p e l l a n t s that the Edwards would pay $10,000.00 toward Appellants' equity 
during June , 1981, i f Appellants would convey to the Edvards their equity 
i n t e r e s t and extend the time for payment of the $18,175.00 equity balance 
for three (3) months. The $18,175.00 unpaid balance would bear interest at 
the r a t e of 13%, and during the extension period, the Edwards would use 
A p p e l l a n t s ' e q u i t y t o secure a second mortgage against the property, the 
proceeds of which would be used to pay Appellants off (T. Vol. I , P. 31). 
Based upon Respondent Davis' representations, Appellants executed 
a Warranty Deed t o t h e i r property to the Edwards and were given a Trust 
Deed N o t e / E x t e n s i o n Agreement, both of which were prepared by Respondent 
Davis (T. V o l . I , P. 31-32. Copies are included as "Exhibits E and Fn in 
the Addendum, and were admitted at t r ia l as Appellants' Exhibit Nos. 5 and 
6) . When they executed the Warranty Deed, Appellants understood that their 
e q u i t y would be used by the Edwards solely as security for a loan to pay 
the $18,175.00 balance, and that no portion of the equity would be used to 
secure payment of the in i t i a l $10,000.00 by the Edwards (T. Vol. I , P. 31). 
A p p e l l a n t s t h e r e a f t e r received, by direct wire transfer into their bank 
checking account in Nevada, $10,000.00, which they believed was the in i t i a l 
payment made by Respondents Edwards from funds which the Edwards had (T. 
Vol. I , P. 26, and see Plaint i f fs ' t r ia l Exhibit No. 28). 
Respondents Edwards failed to pay the $18,175.00 equity balance 
due on September 1 , 1 9 8 1 . Further, during September, 1981, Appellants 
r e c e i v e d a n o t i c e of l a t e payment on the Prudential Federal Savings 
mortgage. Ihey attempted to contact the Edward$ at the home, however, the 
telephone was disconnected. Appellants then contacted neighbors near their 
property who informed them that the Edwards had moved to Idaho (T. Vol. I , 
P. 38). 
In mid-October, A p p e l l a n t s received a second late notice frcm 
Prudent ia l (T. Vol. I , P. 38), and were f inally able to contact Respondent 
D a v i s . A p p e l l a n t s informed Davis that they wanted to "recover the heme" 
and have i t transferred back to their names (T. Vol. I , P. 38-39). 
Respondent Davis insisted that Plaintiffs-Appellants attempt to 
r e - s e l l the home and proposed t h a t they try to lease the hone with an 
o p t i o n t o buy. (T. Vol. I , P. 39). Respondent Davis did not indicate or 
inform A p p e l l a n t s t h a t anyone had taken ppssess ion of the property. 
A p p e l l a n t s i n s t r u c t e d Davis t o forward to then a proposed lease-option 
c o n t r a c t for the ir perusal and approval, and Respondent Davis promised to 
do so. (T. Vol. I , P. 39). 
Unbeknownst t o Appel lants , prior to the f i r s t week of October, 
1 9 8 1 , Respondent Davis had arranged and negotiated the sale of Appellants' 
home by the Edwards t o Respondents Hal and Myrna Barker (T. Vol. I I , P. 
1 4 9 ) . The Edwards-Barker contract was executed on or about October 1, 1981 
(Defendants 1 t r ia l Exhibit No. 31). Respondent Davis prepared and had the 
Edwards and Barkers e x e c u t e the Contrac t f d e s p i t e the fact that he 
a l l e g e d l y had a Quit Claim Deed signed by the Edwards which conveyed the 
property back t o Appellants (T. Vol. I l l , P. 38-40 and Appellants1 t r ia l 
E x h i b i t No. 30) . The Deed, dated October 7, 1981, was not recorded unti l 
October 2 8 , 1 9 8 1 . At t r i a l , Respondent Davis f a i l e d t o g i v e any 
explanation as to why he had the Edwards and Barkers execute their contract 
on October 1, 1981, when he had a Quit Claim Deed frcm the Edwards back to 
A p p e l l a n t s which rendered the Edwards-Barker contract a nul l i ty (T. Vol. 
I l l , P. 73-75). 
Before Appellants received a proposed lease-option contract frcm 
Respondent Davis, the Barkers moved into the residence premises (T. Vol. I , 
P. 3 9 - 4 0 ) . A p p e l l a n t s on ly became aware t h a t the Barkers had taken 
p o s s e s s i o n when a r e l a t i v e went by the property and discovered people 
l i v i n g in the home (T. Vo l . I , P. 4 0 ) . Respondent Davis thereafter 
confirmed t h a t the Barkers had moved in and that he would forward to 
Appellants a proposed lease-option agreement (T. Vol. I , P. 40). 
Respondent Davis f a i l e d t o send A p p e l l a n t s the proposed 
l e a s e - o p t i o n contract for several months (T. Vol. I , P. 41). Finally, in 
A p r i l , 1983 , Respondent Davis forwarded the proposed lease contract 
( A p p e l l a n t s ' t r ia l Exhibit No. 41) . The proposed lease was, in actuality, 
a Uniform Real E s t a t e Contract between the Barkers and Appellants, which 
provided that the Barkers would pay Appellants the balance of their equity 
when i n t e r e s t r a t e s decined to a point where the Barkers total contract 
payments would not exceed $700.00 per month. 
The proposed Contract a l s o made mention of a second mortgage 
o b l i g a t i o n owing against the property in favor of City Consumer Services 
(T. Vo l . I , P. 4 2 ) . According t o the proposed contract, the combined 
Prudent ia l Federal Savings and City Consumer Services mortgages totalled 
$ 3 7 , 5 1 7 . 0 0 , a l though A p p e l l a n t s owed only $27,000.00 on the Prudential 
l o a n . At no t ime f prior to receiving the proposed lease-option contract 
had Appellants been advised of the City Consumer Services debt (T. Vol. I , 
P. 1 6 2 ) . Alarmed, A p p e l l a n t s r e j e c t e d the lease-option proposal and 
i n s i s t e d that Respondent Davis remove the Barkers from their home (T. Vol. 
I f P. 44) . However, the Barkers continued in possession, and only after 
A p p e l l a n t s retained counsel who twice demanded in writing that the Barkers 
purchase the home or vacate (Defendants1 t r ia l Exhibit Nos. 23 and 24), did 
the Barkers f inally leave on August 15, 1983 (T. Vol. I , P. 45). 
The Ci ty Consumer Services mortgage, in the approximate sum of 
$ 1 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , was obta ined by Respondents Edwards with the assistance of 
Respondent Davis (T. Vol. I I , P. 17-18), who made a l l the arrangements for 
o b t a i n i n g the loan (T. Vo l . I I , P. 19 and 143). The Edwards had used 
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 of the loan proceeds t o pay the i n i t i a l equity payment to 
Appellants (T. Vol. I I , P. 13). The Edwards paid the monthly interest-only 
payments on the City Consumer Services mortgage from June through August, 
1 9 8 1 , but made no fur ther payments t h e r e a f t e r (T. Vol. I I , P. 22) . 
Further, they failed to make any payments on the Prudential Federal Savings 
mortgage a f t e r August, 1981, and failed to pay Appellants the $18,175.00 
balance of their equity in accordance with the agreement of the parties (T. 
Vol. I I f P. 12) . 
When A p p e l l a n t s f i n a l l y r e - t o o k possession of their hone on 
August 15 , 1 9 8 3 , they discovered substantial v^ste to the premises. Among 
o ther t h i n g s , A p p e l l a n t s discovered ripped and f i l thy carpets, removed 
drapes and doorknobs, n a i l s and holes in walls , food and other unknown 
subs tance s t a i n s on vgalls, water seepage damage to basement carpeting and 
w a l l s , and d i r t y , inoperable appliances (T. Vol. I , P. 45-46). The waste 
condit ions were confirmed by photographs (Appellants' t r ia l Exhibit No. 8 ) . 
Respondent Davis indicated that when he inspected the home prior to l i s t ing 
i t , none of the waste conditions complained of were present, but rather, 
t h a t the home was "well kept", "show(ed) very well", and was pleasing and 
impressive (T. Vol. I l l , P. 12-13; Appellants' t r ia l Exhibit No. 1 ) . 
Appellants spent $1,438.76 for material and labor (in addition to 
t h e i r own t ime incurred) in remedying the waste and placing their heme in 
a s good condition as i t had been prior to the sale to the Edwards ("Exhibit 
G" in the Addendum, admitted at t r ia l as Appellants' Exhibit No. 9 ) . There 
was no evidence admitted at t r ia l indicating said amount was not reasonably 
and n e c e s s a r i l y incurred to place the heme in as good condition as i t was 
prior to the Edwards' Contract. 
Af ter they r e - t o o k p o s s e s s i o n of the home, Appellants were 
required t o make the f i r s t and second mortgage payments to prevent 
forec losure . The principal amount of the $11,000.00 City Consumer Services 
mortgage , which Respondents Edwards had taken out contrary to the Uniform 
Real E s t a t e C o n t r a c t , was t o be repaid on a 60-month balloon schedule. 
Appellants paid the $156.80 interest-only payments on the mortgage for July 
and August , 1983
 f and paid $470.49 on November 2, 1983 for past-due 
payments and l a t e f e e s for September/ October/ and November/ 1983 
( A p p e l l a n t s ' t r i a l Exhibit No. 19; T. Vol. I f P. 65-66). From December/ 
19 83 / u n t i l A p p e l l a n t s r e - s o l d t h e i r home in September/ 1984/ they 
cont inued to pay the monthly $156.80 interest-only payments (T. Vol. I, P. 
66) . A p p e l l a n t s ' monthly payments on the City Consumer Services mortgage 
totalled $2/038.79. 
On the re-sale of their hcmef Appellants incurred a commission of 
$ 3 / 7 8 0 . 0 0 / and $11/131.76 was deducted frcm the sale proceeds to pay-off 
the Ci ty Consumer Services mortgage (T. Vol. I r P. 69). Appellants would 
have r e c e i v e d t h i s amount from the s a l e but for Respondents Edwards 
obtaining the City Consumer Services mortgage in breach of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. 
As Appellant Theodore Salazar test i f ied at the time of t r ia l / the 
t r a n s a c t i o n s which are the subject natter of this action went on for some 
four y e a r s . During that time/ Appellants suffered great mental distress 
over the s a l e of their prqperty. They became afigry that people with whom 
they had been dealing had breached their agreement and had abused the trust 
which A p p e l l a n t s had p laced in them. Appellants experienced a lack of 
t r u s t in peop le g e n e r a l l y as a r e s u l t of t h e i r d e a l i n g s with the 
Respondents in this action. (T. Vol. I f P. 72) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. While the Uniform Real Estate Contract between Appellants 
and Respondents Edwards may have been modified by the agreement of the 
p a r t i e s / the agreement as modified was enforceable and the Edwards' failure 
t o pay A p p e l l a n t s the $18/175.00 balance of their equity was a material 
breach . There i s no evidence that Appellants ever waived their right to 
receive said equity balance from Respondents-Edwards. 
2 . The Extens ion Agreement of May 20, 1981, between Apellants 
and Respondents Edwards was enforceable in equity against the Edwards as 
(1) Respondents-Edwards waived their defense to the Agreanent based upon 
the s t a t u t e of frauds by f a i l i n g t o p lead s a i d defense, and (2) the 
Agreement was enforceable under the doctrine of part performance. 
3 . Respondents-Edwards are l i a b l e t o Appellants for waste 
committed t o Appellants1 property under the Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
and Respondents-Barker are similarly l iable as licensees of the premises. 
4. A p p e l l a n t s 1 damages for waste are the expenses incurred by 
than in repairing the damage to their home. 
5. Repondent Davis owed Appellants a fiduciary duty even after 
the i n i t i a l closing of Uniform Real Estate Contract between Appellants and 
Respondents-Edwards by h i s cont inued involvement in the transaction 
contemplated by the Contract, and he breached said duty by misrepresenting 
t o Appellants the terms of the Extension Agreement of May 20, 1981, fa i l ing 
t o d i s c l o s s e the fu l l extent of his dealings with Respondents-Edwards, and 
f a i l i n g t o obta in the removal of Respondents-Barker following AppelLants1 
requests therefore. 
6. Respondent Davis fraudulently misrepresented to Appellants 
the terms of the Extens ion Agreement of May 20, 1981, and Respondents 
Casper and Davis are vicariously l iable for his acts . 
ARGUMENT 
1 . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NO 
MATERIAL BREACH OF THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT BY 
RESPONDENTS EDWARDS. 
I t i s undisputed that on May 23, 1980, Appellants entered into a 
Uniform Real E s t a t e Contract for the sale of their hone to Respondents 
Edwards. Pursuant to the Contract, the purchse price of $59,900.00, was to 
be paid $4
 f 500.00 down, and thereafter, Respondents would pay the $287.00 
monthly Prudential Federal Savings mortgage payments unti l June, 1981, when 
Respondents were to pay-off Appellants1 $28,175.00 equity in f u l l . 
The t r i a l court concluded that as the result of the transactions 
between the p a r t i e s from May 23, 1980, unti l September, 1981, Appellants 
waived t h e i r rights to ins i s t on the fu l l performance due on June 1, 1981, 
and t h a t as a r e s u l t of Appellants1 acceptance of the in i t i a l $10,000.00 
payment on June 1 2 , 1 9 8 1 , the Edwards were entit led to the defense of 
excuse of c o n d i t i o n . See Conclusions of Law on Plaintiffs1 First Claim 
for Relief, Nbs. 1 and 2 ) . 
While A p p e l l a n t s may have waived payment of their $28,175.00 
e q u i t y on June 1, 1981, the Uniform Real Estate Contract as modified was 
c e r t a i n l y enforceable against Respondents Edwards according to i t s modified 
terms . Because the Contract was one involving the sale of real property, 
i t f e l l w i t h i n the writing requirement of the statute of frauds, see Utah 
Code Ann. Section 25-5-1, and generally speaking, i f an original agreement 
i s w i t h i n the s t a t u t e , a subsequent agreement that modifies any of the 
m a t e r i a l p a r t s of the original must also satisfy the statute. Golden Key 
R e a l t y , I n c . v . Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, (Utah, 1985). An exception to the 
g e n e r a l rule i s recognized where a party changes position as the result of 
an o r a l modif icat ion , so that i t i s inequitable to permit the other party 
t o c la im as a d e f e n s e the o r i g i n a l , unmodified agreement. White v . 
Fox, 665 P.2d 1297 (Utah, 1983); Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions 
I n c . , 88 U. 194 , 48 P.2d 489 (1935), aff'd reh. 88 U. 213, 53 P.2d 1153 
(1936). 
1 C 
A p p e l l a n t s had changed their position as the result of the oral 
modification between the parties . Appellants executed the Warranty Deed to 
t h e i r homef which they b e l i e v e d Respondents Edwards would use only as 
s e c u r i t y for a loan t o pay the balance of their equity, without having 
r e c e i v e d the i n i t i a l $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 payment. (T. Vol. I , P. 31). Further, 
A p p e l l a n t s withheld pursuing their remedies under the Contract against the 
Edwards, including forfeiting a l l payments as liquidated damages, bringing 
s u i t t o recover Judgment for a l l delinquent installments, and foreclosing 
the Contract as a mortgage. See "Exhibit DM in the Addendum, Paragraph 
1 6 . A, B and C. F u r t h e r , A p p e l l a n t s agreed that a second mortgage be 
p laced on t h e i r home, pursuant to the representations of Respondent Davis 
t h a t by doing so , the Edwards would pay to Appellants the balance of their 
equity. 
S i m i l a r l y , Respondents Edwards performed in accordance with the 
m o d i f i c a t i o n of the Contract. Using Appellants' t i t l e frcm the Wcirranty 
Deed, the Edwards obtained the $11,000.00 City Consumer Services mortgage 
a g a i n s t Appel lants ' property, and paid Appellants $10,000.00 (T. Vol. I I , 
P. 13) . Fur ther , the Edwards paid the monthly payments on the Prudential 
Federal Savings and City Consumer Services f i r s t and second mortgages unti l 
approximately September, 1981 (T. Vol. I , P. 22) . Under these facts , there 
was a v a l i d , e n f o r c e a b l e o r a l modification of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract as a result of the parties' part performance of the same. 
The o r a l m o d i f i c a t i o n executed by the part ies only allowed 
Respondents Edwards additional time to pay Appellants the balance of their 
e q u i t y ; i t did not terminate the Edwards' obligation to do so. Respondent 
J o e l Edwards t e s t i f i e d at t r ia l that as the result of the negotiations in 
May, 1 9 8 1 , the Edwards r e c e i v e d additional time to pay Appellants the 
ba lance of their equity (T. Vol. I I , P. 35). No where in the testimony i s 
there any indicat ion by any of the parties that the Edwards were relieved 
of their obligation to pay Appellants their equity. 
Respondents Edwards' failure to pay to Appellants the fu l l amount 
of t h e i r e q u i t y in accordance with the modified Contract was a material 
breach, and the tr ia l court erred in finding to the contrary. The Edwards1 
recording of the Quit Claim Deed back t o Appellants did not effect a 
t erminat ion of the Uniform Real Estate Contract between the parties as the 
t r i a l cour t found. See Conclus ion of Law No. 3 on Appellants' First 
Claim for R e l i e f . In order for there t o be a v a l i d r e c i s s i o n or 
t erminat ion of a contract, the party seeking recission or termination must 
not be in d e f a u l t . Cf. Thackeray v . Knight , 57 U. 2 1 , 192 P. 263 
(1920) (buyer's oral recission of contract for sale of land was valid when 
s e l l e r breached c o n t r a c t ) ; a l s o s e e Dastrup v . Smuin, 179 F.2d 860 
(CA 1 0 , 1950). Recording of the Edwards' Quit Claim Deed did not effect a 
v a l i d t erminat ion or r e c i s s i o n because the Edwards were in default in 
payment of the balance of Appellants' equity. 
Further, there was no valid basis for the Edwards to terminate or 
r e s c i n d the c o n t r a c t . See e . g . , Foxley v . Rich, 35 U. 162 99 P. 666 
(1909) (breach of a covenant which prevents a party from performing wi l l 
provide a b a s i s for r e c i s s i o n ) ; Thackeray, supra, (a defect in t i t l e to 
r e a l property which prevents a se l ler from conveying t i t l e as agreed wi l l 
be a b a s i s for r e c i s s i o n ) ; Elder v. Clawson, 14 U.2d 379, 384 P.2d 802 
(1963) (fraud of a party wi l l serve as a basis for reciss ion) . The Edwards 
attempted t o terminate their contract simply because they did not wish to 
make further payments on Appellants1 home or pay them their equity as due, 
which was not a proper basis for recission or termination under the law. 
F u r t h e r , t h e r e was no v a l i d r e c i s s i o n or termination of the 
c o n t r a c t by the Edwards s i n c e they failed to restore Appellants to the 
s t a t u s quo. In McMoneqal v. Fritsch Loan and Trust Co., 75 U. 470, 286 
P. 635; r e h e a r , den . 76 U. 179, 289 P. 91 (1930), the Supreme Court held 
t h a t in order for a purchaser of real property to rescind an agreement to 
purchase , he must o f f e r t o r e s t o r e the s e l l e r t o the status quo by 
account ing for the rental value of the property and depreciation. In this 
c a s e , the Edwards made no attempt to account to Appellants for the rental 
v a l u e or depreciation to the property during the period of their occupancy, 
and f u r t h e r , they l e f t A p p e l l a n t s wi th an $11,000.00 second mortgage 
against the property, which was not present before the Contract. 
There was a material breach of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
by Respondents Edwards. The Contract may have been orally modified by the 
p a r t i e s , but a s a r e s u l t of the parties1 part performance, the modified 
c o n t r a c t was e n f o r c e a b l e . The alleged modification did not relieve the 
Edwards of their obligation to pay Appellants the balance of their equity. 
The Edwards' attempted termination of the Contract was ineffective bescause, 
a t the t ime of record ing of the Quit Claim Deed, the Edvards were in 
d e f a u l t , had no proper grounds for a recission or termination, and fai led 
t o p l a c e A p p e l l a n t s in the same position as they had been prior to the 
Contrac t . There was a material breach of the Contract since the Edwards 
f a i l e d t o pay Appellants the balance of their equity, and Appellants are 
entit led to their damages resulting therefrom. 
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In computing the amount of Appellants' damages, the Supreme Court 
has s e t f o r t h s e v e r a l f a c t o r s which are to be considered. Loss of an 
advantageous b a r g a i n , damage to or depreciation of the property, and the., 
f a i r r e n t a l va lue during the period of the occupancy are a l l recoverable 
e lements of damage. Johnson v . Carman, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah, 1980). 
Fur ther , in S o f f e v . Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah, 1983) the Suprane Court 
i n d i c a t e d t h a t the r e a l e s t a t e commission paid upon the sale to a 
d e f a u l t i n g buyer and attorney's fees (when the contract provides that a 
defaulting party should pay the same) are also recoverable damages. 
With the r u l i n g in Johnson and S o f f e in mind, Appellants1 
damages may be simply computed. While Respondents Edwards paid Appellants 
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 during June, 1981, toward their total equity, they did so by 
sadd l ing A p p e l l a n t s with the $11,000.00 City Consumer Services mortgage. 
A p p e l l a n t s gained nothing in actuality from the Edwards' payment; in fact , 
they were put in a worse position by the Edwards' breach of the Contract, 
s i n c e they had a $11,000.00 mortgage against their home which they would 
never have had had Respondents Edwards made no payment at a l l . When 
A p p e l l a n t s f i n a l l y were able to re - se l l their home, they were required to 
pay-o f f the Ci ty Consumer S e r v i c e s mortgage a t a cost of $11,131.76 
(Respondents' t r i a l Exhibit No. 14). Thus, upon re-sale , Appellants were 
e f f e c t i v e l y denied $10,000.00 of their equity, and were, in fact , required 
t o pay an additional $1,131.76 on the City Consumer Services mortgage which 
they never r e c e i v e d . As the r e s u l t of Respondents Edwards' breach, 
A p p e l l a n t s s u f f e r e d the l o s s of t h e i r advantageous bargain with the 
Edwards, and were depr ived of $10,000.00 worth of equity in their hone 
t o g e t h e r with the additional $1,131.76 they were required to pay. These 
amounts, tota l l ing $11,131.76, are recoverable damages against Respondents 
Edwards, consistent with Johnson v . , supra. 
Fur ther , A p p e l l a n t s are e n t i t l e d t o recover their monthly 
i n t e r e s t - o n l y payments on the City Consumer Services mortgage. Subsequent 
t o the v a c a t i o n of the premises by the Barkers, Appellants paid $2,038.79 
i n monthly City Consumer Services mortgage payments, unti l the property was 
r e - s o l d in September, 1984 (T. Vol. I , Pp. 66-67). Appellants would never 
had incurred this expense but for the breach of contract by the Edwards. 
A p p e l l a n t s are a l s o entit led to recover the difference between 
the amounts paid by the Edwards during the period of their occupancy, and 
t h e f a i r r e n t a l v a l u e o f t h e p r o p e r t y . See Johnson, supra . 
Testimony a t t r i a l was undisputed that in 1980, when the Uniform Real 
E s t a t e Contract was executed, the reasonable rental value of Appellants1 
home was $475.00 per month (T. Vol. I I , P. 16-17). Accordingly, the total 
r easonab le monthly r e n t a l during the Edwards1 15-month occupancy frcm 
approximately June 1, 1980, through the end of August, 1981, was $7,125.00 
(15 months a t $475 .00 per nonth). During the period of their occupancy, 
the Edwards paid $1,000.00 to Appellants at closing (in excess of the real 
e s t a t e commission) (T. V o l . I , P. 2 7 ) , and $287.00 per month on the 
P r u d e n t i a l Federa l Savings mortgage. Thus, during the period of their 
occupancy, Defendants-Respondents Edwards paid on ly $5,305.00 and 
A p p e l l a n t s are entit led to the sum of $1,820.00, as and for the difference 
between the amount paid by the Edvards and the fair rental value of the 
premises. See Soffe and Johnson v . , supra. 
F i n a l l y , Appellants are entitled to recover the $3,500.00 sales 
commission which they paid to Respondents Davis and Casper upon the sale to 
the Edwards, and the t h e i r attorney's fees incurred in this matter, see 
S o f f e , supra . Up t o the time of t r i a l , Appellants' incurred costs and 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s t o t a l l i n g $7,046.76 (Appellants' tr ia l Exhibit No. 10). 
A p p e l l a n t s p r o f f e r e d through t h e i r Closing Memorandum submitted after 
t r i a l , t h a t they had incurred an additional $1,200.00 in attorney's fees 
subsequent t o t r i a l (See P l a i n t i f f s ' Closing Memorandum, P. 14). in 
accordance wi th the Uniform Real Estate Contract, Appellants are entit led 
t o recover their $8,246.76 attorney's fees incurred through t r i a l , together 
with their attorney's fees and costs incurred in this appeal. 
A c c o r d i n g l y , the Judgment entered by the t r i a l court on 
Appellants' First Claim for Relief should be reversed, and this case should 
be remanded to the tr ia l court with instructions to enter Judgment in favor 
of Appellants against Respondents Edwards as follows: 
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 - l o s s of equity ( loss of advantageous bargain 
upon re-sale); 
$ 1 , 131 .76 - amount of City Consumer Services mortgage paid 
by Appellants in excess of amount received; 
$ 3 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 - real estate commission incurred in the sale to 
Respondents Edwards; 
$ 2 , 0 3 8 . 7 9 - monthly Ci ty Consumer S e r v i c e s mortgage 
interest-only payments paid by; 
$ 1 , 8 2 0 . 0 0 - d i f f e r e n c e between amount rece ived from 
Respondents Edwards and the fair rental value 
of Appel lants ' heme during the period of their 
occupancy; 
$ 8 , 2 4 6 . 7 6 - a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s incurred by Appellants, 
t o g e t h e r with attorney's fees incurred in this 
appeal; 
$26,737.31 - TOTAL. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EXTENSION 
AGREEMENT OF MAY 2 0 , 1 9 8 1 , WAS UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, BECAUSE (1) RESPONDENTS EDWARDS HAD 
. 9 1 . 
WAIVED THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF STATUTE OF FRAUDS, AND 
( 2 ) THE PARTIES' PART PERFORMANCE OF THE EXTENSION 
AGREEMENT TOOK IT OUT OF THE STATUTE. 
A. Respondents Edwards waived any defense to enforcement of 
the Extension Agreement of May 20, 1981
 f based upon the 
S t a t u t e of Frauds, s i n c e they f a i l e d to plead said 
defense with particularly. 
Rule 8 ( c ) of t h e Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a 
p a r t y # in p l e a d i n g t o a preceding pleading, set forth affirmatively the 
s t a t u t e of frauds as an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e . In t h e i r Answer to 
A p p e l l a n t s 1 Complaint, dated February 14, 1984, Respondents Edwards fai led 
t o plead the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense. "The consequence 
of t h i s procedural error i s set forth in Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil 
P r o c e d u r e , which s t a t e s t h a t "(a) party waives a l l d e f e n s e s and 
o b j e c t i o n s which he does not p r e s e n t e i t h e r by motion as hereinabove 
provided o r , i f he had made no mot ion , in h i s answer or reply. . ." 
P h i l l i p s v . JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah, 1983). Indeed, 
the s t a t u t e of frauds i s a d e f e n s e that can be waived by failure of a 
defendant t o p lead i t as an affirmative defense. Bentley v. Potter, 694 
P.2d 617 (Utah, 1984); Skeen v. Van Sickle, 71 U. 577, 268 P. 562 (1928). 
Respondents Edwards effectively waived the affirmative defense of 
s t a t u t e of frauds s ince they failed to plead the same in their Answer to 
A p p e l l a n t s ' Complaint. They could not set up said defense as a basis to 
deny A p p e l l a n t s ' c laim under the Extension Agreement of May 20, 1981, at 
t r i a l . A c c o r d i n g l y , the t r i a l c o u r t ' s conclusion that the Extension 
Agreement of May 20, 1981, was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, 
Utah Code Ann. Section 25-5-1, was in error. 
B. The Extension Agreement of May 20, 1981, was enforceable 
under the doctrine of part performance. 
The s t a t u t e of frauds requires that a contract for the sale of 
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development of mineral quarries was sufficient part performance to enforce 
an o r a l agreement for the conveyance of mining claims. In this case, not 
on ly was $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 paid by the Edwards, but Appellants executed the 
Warranty Deed to their home, and allowed the Edv^rds to remain in occupancy 
u n t i l t h e b a l a n c e of the equity interest was paid. There was sufficient 
part performance of the Extension Agreement. 
Further, the part performance by the parties was of such a nature 
t h a t to deny enforcement of the Extension Agreement would constitute fraud. 
Under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , enforcement of the Agreenent i s particularly 
a p p r o p r i a t e . See Utah Mercur Gold Min. Co. v. Herschel Gold Min. Co., 
103 U. 249, 134 P.2d 1094 (1943). Appellants l ived up to their part of the 
Extens ion Agreement by e x e c u t i n g the Warranty Deed to their heme and 
al lowing the Edwards to remain in occupancy unti l the balance of the equity 
was p a i d . To a l l o w the Edwards to deny the existence of the Extension 
Agreement, when A p p e l l a n t s had partially performed, would constitute a 
f raud , e s p e c i a l l y s ince the Edwards had used Appellants1 equity frcm the 
Warranty Deed to secure the $11,000.00 City Consumer Services mortgage, and 
l e f t Appellants with that second encumbrance against their property. 
2 . Part performance must be in pursuance of the agreement. 
The t e s t imony a t t r i a l was undisputed that the $10,000.00 i n i t i a l equity 
payment was paid in order to allow Respondents Edwards additional time to 
pay the ba lance of the e q u i t y due Appellants (T. Vol. I I , P. 34). The 
i n i t i a l payment was made after Appellants executed the Warranty Deed, and 
the p a r t i e s had agreed t o the extension of time. Accordingly, the part 
performance was done in pursuance of the Extension Agreement. 
3 No 2§ !• !:: per formance vrould have occurred in the absence 
of t h e a g r e e m e n t . Appellant Theodore Salazar testified, a t t r i a l that he 
b e l i e v e t h a t t h e E x t e n s i o n Agreement a s was r e p r e s e n t e d to him by 
Respondent Davis was binding (T. Vol ,. I , P, 30). appellants1 testimony in 
conveyed away $28,175.00 worth of equity in real property unless there 'was 
some reasonable assurance, that they would receive the fu l l •amount to which 
they were en t i t led. 
4 . C o n s i d e r a t i o n must be g i v e n . In t h i s r e g a r d , 
A p p e l l a n t s exte.nd.ed, the time for pay-off of the i r equity and executed, the 
A p p e l l a n t s t h e i n i t i a l $10,000 00 j: .j 1 " 1 : n t IT Vol I I , P. 3 3 ) . It .- are "was 
good and adequate consideration flowing betweei the pa r t i e s to support the 
Extension AqnMi*?.rit 
5 . The te rms of the agreement must be suff ic ient ly def in i te 
and c e r t a i n The Extension, Agreement of May 20#- 1,981, as described, by 
$ 2 8 , 1 7 5 . 0 0 equity due to Appellants under the Uniform "Real Estate Contract 
by payi ng t h e sum, of $] 0 ,-000 .00 down on June 3 „, 3 981, and paving the 
ba ] ance t h e r e a f t e r Th s $] 8 , Il i; 5 00 ba ] a nee was di le a - > 
Appe l l an t s , September 1 , ] 98] (T. Vol I , P. 28). The record i s undisputed 
t h a t t h e Edwards did pay 'the sum, of $10,000,00,. and the Edwards themselves 
r e c o v e r t h e i r down payment (T. Vol. I I , P. 34-35). There i s no dispute 
anywhere in t h e r e c o r d what the sum of $18,175.00 was due to Appellants 
HIT 
from the Edwards as and for the ba lance of t h e i r e q u i t y interest . 
Accord ing ly / the terms of the Extens ion Agreement were sufficiently 
d e f i n i t e and certain to render the agreement enforceable under the doctrine 
of part performance. 
The on ly ambigu i ty , i f any there i s , regarding the Extension 
Agreement i s when the $18 ,175 .00 equity balance was to have been paid. 
However, any ambiguity or indefiniteness in this regard i s not fa ta l . In 
Chr i s t ensen v . C h r i s t e n s e n , 9 U.2d 102, 339 P.2d 101 (1959), in a suit 
for s p e c i f i c performance of a paro l land s a l e s c o n t r a c t , the only 
u n c e r t a i n t y in the contract terms was the time for payment of the purchase 
p r i c e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the t r ia l court found that the parties had not set 
any d a t e for payment of the purchase price, and the Supreme Court ruled 
t h a t "the time of payment necessarily i s implied and ca l l s for performance 
within a reasonable time." Id . , at 104. 
In t h i s c a s e , there i s evidence that the balance of Appellants1 
e q u i t y i n t e r e s t was due on or b e f o r e . September 1, 1981. The written 
Extension Agreement sets forth said date, and Appellant Theodore Salazar so 
t e s t i f i e d (T. Vo l . I , P. 2 8 ) . Respondents Edwards did not dispute 
A p p e l l a n t s ' t e s t imony in t h i s regard. Indeed, Respondent Joel Edwards 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t payment of the i n i t i a l $10,000.00 gave him additional time 
t o pay the ba lance of the equity (T. Vol. I I , P. 34). However, even i f 
t h i s Honorable Court should conclude t h a t the payment due date was 
ambiguous, the t r i a l c o u r t , consistent with Christensen, supra, should 
have impl ied t h a t performance was due w i t h i n a reasonable time, and 
enforced the Extension Agreement accordingly. 
The Extension Agreement ot May *Mlr 19H1, was enforceable", .ml MI<> 
t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i m denying Appellants' claim lor r e l i e t basoJ Lhereun. 
The Agreement was suff icient ly performed to take it outside of I:he s t a tu te 
ul: fraud6- Thf" Aq repitionl f i nniis wen-» suf f ir iPi ' i l 1 y defi i i i f 'H -inul i i ' M . i i n . 
The tr ia* w a i t ' s t a i lu re to e i to ice iJie AyiMjmenl was e r ro t . 
APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT FOR TREBLE DAMAGES ON 
THEIR WASTE CLAIM AGAINST BOTH RESPONDENTS EDWARDS AND 
BARKER, 
Th l , J I i i ri 1 r n i l l ' 1 Dill I IK 111) I II 11 III A p p r ' l l t l l t h Wt-11 i • llliul i-Mlt II t |i ill I 
r e c o v e r on t h e n c l a i m s t o r was te because they fai led to prove then: 
a l l eged , damage r e p a i r c o s t s , f a i l e d lu show exclusive occupancy and 
e s t a b l i s h , t h a t the "'waste whi eh, they complained of caused a, diminution in 
t h e v a l u e of t h e i r property (Conclusions of Law on P l a i n t i f f ' s Fourth and 
conclusions 
When Appel lan t s re-took possession of the home af ter the Barkers 
no t been p r e s e n t when, the Edwards took, possession: carpeting was ripped,, 
and d i r t y (T 'Veil I f P, 45-5,1)? draperies had been removed (P 45); there 
d e g r e a s i n g and r e p a i n t i rig (1 47); soap dispensers 'had, been ripped,,, off 
w a l l s ( P , 4 8 ) ; t h e r e wei: e ho] e s in wa ] ] s (P. 50), and water damage to 
and appliances were d i r t y and I nqperable (Pp. 54-56). The 'waste conditions 
were co,nfi,rmed, by photographs admitted without objection. 
nn^ 
F u r t h e r , A p p e l l a n t s spent $ l f 438 .76 for repairs (Appellants1 
t r i a l Exhibit No. 9 , and see T. Vol. I , P. 58-59), and the testimony as to 
the n e c e s s i t y of the r e p a i r s or the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of the cost was 
u n d i s p u t e d . Accordingly, the t r ia l court1 s finding that Appellants failed 
to prove their repair costs was without merit. 
The t r i a l cour t further erred in denying Appellants' claim for 
waste against Respondents Edwards. The claim against the Edwards was based 
upon the Contract between the parties which provided, at Paragraph 15, that 
"(b)uyer a g r e e s t h a t he w i l l not conroit or suffer to be committed any 
w a s t e , s p o i l or d e s t r u c t i o n in or upon (the) premises, and that he w i l l 
mainta in ( t h e ) premises in good c o n d i t i o n . " Respondent Joel Edwards 
t e s t i f i e d that he read and understood the Contract and acknowledged that i f 
he f a i l e d t o keep the premises in good condition or committed waste or 
s u f f e r e d waste to be coimitted on the premises, that he would be in breach 
(T. Vol. I I , Pp. 28-29). 
The evidence i s undisputed that Appellants incurred $1,438.76 for 
the repairs, and that Appellants' heme was in good condition at the time of 
the Edwards' Contract. Appellant Theodore Salazar tes t i f i ed that none of 
the conditions depicted in the photographs of the home were present when i t 
was s o l d (T. V o l . I , P. 5 6 ) . Fur ther , the Listing Agreement between 
A p p e l l a n t s and Respondents Davis and Casper confirms that the hone was 
"wel l kept" and "shows very well". Even Respondent Davis tes t i f i ed that at 
the time of the Listing Agreement, the hone was pleasing and impressive and 
t h a t none of the waste conditions complained of by Appellants were present 
(T. Vol. I l l , P. 12-13). 
-28-
" u ^ a i n t.-^ir JU:M^I <i showing '-exclusive ')ccupaucy and txjssessiun1 u> a^ 
Edwards d u r r : * n^ M^nod th.-y a l l e g e *"h^ w-»s*"p rr nave ( r a n l f 
whomever committed, except as caused bv act of o^-, public enemy or u> --JO 
h o l d e r of a reversionary interest • -~ - Section * *66. 
KespoiitJeii I ii KdiWr'i ri'Is. *i"< i i» I 1 alili11 * I In - ' 
p r o p e r t y in a c c o r d a n c e with the Uninor: <eai Estate contract hat vie 
damage complained of may have been caused by vandals or the Ba^^*~c s- ; 
in i i iitp'Oi I s in ti i»,. LI i II I i:M 1,1K' i luil. i a i l , llllit"111 tiiwat ds.,, . i r e i espous i -h l i I i in all 1 
w a s t e , however o r by whomever c o m m i t t e d . 
F u r t h e r , the t r i a l court erred in concluding that Appellants had 
in,, I s.l in «! II ii. unagea I m \ A-ISII H since IJiej I id I in il nstdbiished .J my d LIII.I mil. 1,1,.HI 
in t h e value of their home. At common law, lairaiges for waste were assessoJ 
a c c o r d i n g t o tho d i m i n u t i o n in the value of the property caused by I he 
w a s t e , IMo'ii u ti: „. eii'ill I y , h< & * \ v.t cotufs Iwve held tliat such diirunut: ion nil 
v a l u e can be shown by e v i d e n c e of the cos t of r epa i r s . See e.g.
 r In 
re Stout ' s Estate, 50 P.2d 768 (Ore, 1935) 
Where t h e c o s t ::i)f repa :i 1: s i n fa r II ess than the reasonabl e val ue 
of t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y cl aimed to have been damaged, jus t ice i s served, by 
p e r m i t t j ng t h e owner to recover as damages the* monetary cost of repa i ring 
F i r e Ins . . Co,, v . Ma t h i s , 334 p. 2d 186 (Ore, 1 959); 4 Sutherland,, Damages 
(4th ed ) 3767; McCormick Damages 48-! n If) (1935); Johnson v. Northwest 
Accep tance C o r p . , 185 IE 2 1 11 2 (0:i < •. Ill'"» Il I , I I 111 j v . U.M.C. I n d u s t r i e s , 
I n c . , 6 3 7 S .W. 2d 5 5 {.Mo, Apt I i n d e e d , " < i ) f t h e p r o p e r t y c a n 'be 
repa ired or r e s t o r e d / i t i s the reasonable cost of repair or restoration 
( t h a t i s the proper measure of damages for waste), not exceeding the fair 
market or a c t u a l v a l u e of the improvements immediately prior to the 
damage.n Duckett v . Whorton, 312 N.W. 2d 561, 562 (Iowa, 1982). In the 
p r e s e n t c a s e , s i n c e the repair cost was small in comparison to the total 
v a l u e of the p r o p e r t y , and was r e a d i l y ascertainable as set forth in 
Appellants' t r ia l Exhibit No. 9 , the proper measure of damages on the waste 
c l a i m was the cost of repair, which should have been trebled in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. Section 78-38-2. 
Further, the t r ia l court erred in denying Appellants' waste claim 
a g a i n s t Respondents Barker. The Barkers took occupancy pursuant to their 
a l l e g e d agreement with the Edwards, and " ( i ) t has been specif ical ly held 
t h a t t h o s e who e n t e r upon property with the consent of a possessor have 
s u f f i c i e n t privity of t i t l e (with an owner) to be subject to an action for 
waste as l i c e n s e e s " . Smith v . CAP Concrete, 184 Cal. Rptr. 308, 311, 
(1982) c i t i n g Southern Pacific Land Co. v . Kiggins, 110 Cfcl. App. 56, 293 
P. 708 (1930); Fuller v. Montafi, 55 Cal. App. 314, 203 P. 406 (1921). 
The t r i a l court erred in denying Appellants re l ief on their waste 
c l a i m . The e v i d e n c e i s undisputed that the waste conditions of which 
A p p e l l a n t s complained were not present when the Edwards took possession. 
Respondents Edwards are l i a b l e for waste under t h e i r Contract with 
A p p e l l a n t s . Respondents Barkers are l iable since they entered Appellants' 
premises wi th the permis s ion of the Edwards, and accordingly , had 
s u f f i c i e n t privity with Appellants to be subject to an action for waste as 
l i c e n s e e s . The proper measure of damages for waste i s the cost of 
r e p a i r i n g the premises to place then in the same state of repair as they 
w e r e b e f o r e t h e E d w a r d s t o o k o c c u p a n c y . '!' n: s.iir,, undisputed t o be 
? 1 ,4^9., " •• i o e t r e b l e d i n ac .:.:..•• • 
I i i - J . ' m e n t s h o u l d be ent^i**; a g a i n s t Respondents adwards and 
Barkers acco rd inq ly . 
i imKJ, WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT THAT RESPONDENT DAVIS AND CASPER BREACHED THEIR 
FIDUCIARY DUTY TO APPELLANTS, AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NO BREACH. 
9 
Respondent, u o ^ a *u - -e^odi u a , . es ia :^ -*\^ -Si s ix, w* hose lioen&t? 
R e s p o n d e d " Vance Casoer d i v a Centar> Zi~Ca? »-• * npanv
 t -
mi v i 1 p s t <i I M I nt i ilk i in l I  Il I I , 1 p 'il'iifll' --:ate sal esmai l whose 
L i c e n s e in w i t h a bioltei „ LS an employee of die b roke r , a nd the broker i s 
L i a b l e f o r t o r t i o u s a c t s committed by the sa] esman wi th in the course and 
. ( • o 1 1 < A ,' ' i«•),, 1' i y • ,ii i" P h i l l i p s v . J CIyt Development Corp*, supra . 
R e s p o n d e n t D a v i s 1 1 i c e n s e remained with Respondent Casper un t i 1 June 5 , 
1.98J i illi »n Respondent Casper informed the Sal t l a k e Board of Real t o r s t h a t 
. ; a . u d i noi-.ce UJ r.he ^xmLracy
 t could assume ~tnd rexy on the fac t tnar urr u 
june 5# 19hl ? an employer-employee r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t e d between Respondents 
The o.: , . . . ixesp^udcr.iL Davis 'rxnmitted p r i o r t c Tune 5, 1981, 
were wit v : ;~; t h e course and scope of h i s emolovme •• . - a v i s nad executed a 
--.*-.* wd: '.. ji-r p u r p o s - ••? M - -^Tu)loyment w i t r -^<~- . *jer.:: Casper. He 
p r e p a r e d t h e E a r n e s t Money Receipt and Offer tc Purchase Agreement dated 
on 
brokerage company handling the sale (Exhibit No. 2 ) , and he prepared and 
s igned the Uniform Real Estate Contract eventually executed by Appellants 
and the Edwards (Exhibit No. 3 ) . 
Respondent Davis1 involvement in the sale did not conclude with 
the c l o s i n g on May 23, 1980. Rather, in May, 1981f while he was s t i l l in 
the employ of Respondent Casper, Davis contacted Appellants for the purpose 
of r e - n e g o t i a t i n g the pay -o f f of t h e i r $28,175.00 equity. Appellant 
Theodore Salazar, reasonably believing that Respondent Edwards was s t i l l an 
employee of Respondent Casper, and having no notice to the contrary, relied 
upon the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of Davis and agreed to the extended pay-off (T. 
V o l . I , P. 28) . Thus, at the time of the Extension Agreement of May, 1981, 
Respondent Davis was s t i l l an employee of Respondent Casper, acting within 
the scope and course of his employment in negotiating said Agreement. 
The t r i a l cour t found t h a t Davis and Casper fu l f i l l ed their 
o b l i g a t i o n s t o A p p e l l a n t s under the L i s t i n g Agreement by finding the 
Edwards, ready will ing and able buyers of Appellants' home. While a real 
e s t a t e agency r e l a t i o n s h i p generally terminates upon the expiration of a 
L i s t i n g Agreement or when a broker-salesman secures a buyer, the agency 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , and fiduciary duties attendant thereto, may be extended by 
i m p l i c a t i o n by the acts of the parties . In Pyles v. Cole, 241 S.W.2d 841 
(Tenn. 1951), the court held that were a se l ler continued negotiations with 
a broker a f t e r the termination of a brokerage contract, or requested the 
broker t o c o n t i n u e h i s act ions , a brokerage contract i s renewed and the 
termination provision i s waived. 
In t h i s c a s e , Respondent D a v i s , while s t i l l in the employ of 
Casper, contacted Appellants specif ically with reference to the sale which 
^ -a , j o*_.-* ' c - ne,}0t i ^1-*i ^ v ^ i ^ n r c r^asonably be 11 eved "H^ "^vis , 
e 
r h ; m a * . ransac t i ' ^ :•/.* *. ! . \:ed ny f:ne uniforn* Real Estate Contract 
'1 <»i _ i J * : . - i p r v , . t . i d 
e x p e c t t r r - . i e q u i t y paym-j.;i \ c e o r d m g l e 
p r i n c i p a l - a g e n t rr?.lationship between Appellants and Respondents *-- d 
Casper c o n t i nued a l t e r the closing ul I J salt -...;. .vp^**or/js' « .~ f t^d 
Responden t s Davis and Casper were bound fc^ the fiduciary dut ies attendant 
to tha t re Jl a t lonship . 
The t r i a l c o u r t held t h a t A p p e l l a n t s t a i l e d t o prove by a 
p repondence of t h e ev idence that they conveyedl their equity in teres t in 
t h e i r hone t :> the Edwards a! tin» i nstaiiipp" incl b:ihest of Respondent Davi s , 
based upon his representations that the Edwards would pay $10,000.00 "'toward 
Appel lan ts 1 equity on or before June 1, 198] , and would use the i r equity to 
was s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e b e f o r e 'the t r i a l court supporting Appellants1 
al legat ions in th i s regard. 
con tac ted him :i n May, 1 983 , representing that the Edwards could not pay the 
$ 2 8 / 1 7 5 . 0 0 e q u i t y when d u e , and p roposed t h a t the Edwards would pay 
','i 1 Hi , 0 0 1 ) mi I 'Hi in I in i il I In J e q i u i t v I i I A p ( ) e l I a n ! s w i u l d P X ! e n d t h e t : i me for 
payment oi the bU\, J ih AM balance Lor three (J) munths, with the balance to 
hea r i n t e r e s t at H » per annum. '<"" I , m<i on Defendant-Respondent Davis1 
i" i? p reseni I" i-i t" innis , Plain! iff-Appel Lants exeoiitetl the Wa rra 111 \ IDefai lc lMI>-»ir 
p r o p e r t y in tavor oi t he Edwards (T, Vol I, P, 28), Appellant Salazar 
f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d that he understood his equity was to be used to finance 
payment of the $18,175.00 equity balance only, and that if he knew that the 
Edwards would use his equity to secure the $10,000.00 i n i t i a l payment, he 
would have never had gone along with the transaction (T. Vol. I , P. 30). 
Sa lazar t e s t i f i e d that he f e l t secure in conveying his equity interest to 
the property to the Edwards, s ince, at that point, Appellants had received 
the $ 4 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 down payment, would shortly receive the $10,000.00 i n i t i a l 
e q u i t y payment, and had an agreement for payment of the $18,175.00 balance, 
which vas to bear interest at 13% (T. Vol. I , P. 30). 
Respondent Davis t e s t i f i e d that he did, in fact , discuss this 
transact ion with Appellant Theodore Salazar (T. Vol. I I , P. 147). However, 
he i n d i c a t e d that Appellants chose an option whereby they would deed their 
e q u i t y i n t e r e s t in the property t o the Edwards, who would secure a 
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 loan against the property and pay Appellants that amount, with 
the Edwards to execute a Quit Claim Deed back to Appellants to be released 
i f they defaulted in payment of the equity balance. 
The s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e in the record supports Appellants' 
p o s i t i o n on t h i s i s s u e . A p p e l l a n t s ' bank statement for June, 1981, 
v e r i f i e d t h a t a $10,000.00 direct deposit was made into their account in 
accordance wi th Respondent Dav i s ' r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s (Exhibit No. 28) . 
Further, the Extension Agreement dated May 20, 1981, prepared by Respondent 
D a v i s and g i v e n t o A p p e l l a n t s by him, c o r r o b o r a t e s A p p e l l a n t s ' 
understanding t o of the transact ion (Exhibit No. 6 ) . Further, the City 
Consumer S e r v i c e s mortgage was taken out against the property by the 
Edwards unbeknowst t o Appe l lants and not for $10,000.00, which was the 
amount t o be received by Appellants. Further, Respondent Davis tes t i f i ed 
- ;iah: unless he disclosed to Appellants the exi stance of the City Consumer 
•••I r i . - r - , mini fi t - f f P f , i i n - i i ' wi ii III! n II h a v f U.M'ii in Ihi-' i w ty I in l l i a i i h i d i s c o v e r 
i, lie same, since he put the Edwards in icontact with City Consinttai Services, 
n e g o t i a t e d the mor tgage t ransact ion, assisted the Edwards with the Loan 
i |i|ji II 11"'11 'ueivol !lliNj> | mi cxvudi- nl IJK- nur tgaije, anJ luiMinled then by 
- t - e i .arik t r a n s f e i : t o Appel lants '* account m Nevada IT, Vuu , l l f i<[i. 
1.42-143.-. 
.-:.-, -*= ~J . . , . . .^ corrooorates 
Appel lants 1 — .JV*. The Dead ^as elated October •• Exhibit No,
 9 
\\ d a t e •-' * * Apnel ! ^ .: ' T' ^d *r? Salarn*" T>rt.a *~ ~d * : I 
i infrirue . was 
a l s o after Appellants had received two notices of default :>n the Prudential 
F e d e r a l Savings mortgage, which the FHwards were o t ' >v a 
Uniform Real Estate Qjni Mi"! I I nl III, I p. I/-.)'!) 
Respondent Davis t e s t i f i e d that he had1 the Edwards execute the 
Qui t Claim Deed contemporaneous!', with the f J '•* * ^ ^ 
I I a i I s en j11 MM ir arid t'i\\l\ datjrsd Lhe Deed when he wa.. , cjquirea t o £ ^ J K , * 1 . 
V o l . I l f P . 1 4 8 ; Vol . I I I „ T, 12 i , Respcrxier.t a v i s i s not c r e d i b l p in 
t h i s r e g a r d f o r severa l reafuwi'i" F i r s t , M>=> r**^ * > i 
Ortobei , I'MII Respondent. Ltavi. would lev *a.; nave acced ^.--ntiary o 
h i s s t a t u t o r y d u t i e s a s a Notary Public1 in oider to the date 'the deed 
subsequent to the time when the Edwards executed ill Further hr» tes t i f i ed 
tha i lit, lialrirl the* de-d WIK-M II reeorcled LIJ
 fnt , the Deed was dated October 
7 th and not. r e c o r d e d u n t i l Oc tober 2 8 t h . F u r t h e r , Respondent Davis 
n e g o t i a t e d t h e s a l e tT^nsacHop hHwpon HIP Edwards * ^ * \ • 
haul in In •» ||j.;ii i, mi t»s e x e c u i e i Diuiutni Keal his l a t e C o n t r a ^ « ion a<~< o t e p a ^ a 
(Defendants ' Exhibit No. 31). That contract was rendered a nul l i ty by the 
Edwards/Salazar Quit Claim Deed which Davis a l l e g e d l y had i n his 
p o s s e s s i o n . When q u e s t i o n e d as t o why he prepared the Edwards/Barker 
contract when he alleged had the Edwards/Salazar Quit Claim Deed, Defendant 
Davis could offer no reasonable explanation (T. Vol I I I , Pp. 73-75). 
The b e t t e r , more substantial evidence i s that Respondent Davis 
d id not have the Edwards' Quit Claim Deed, but rather, that the transaction 
had been handled in the manner described by Appellants. No reasonable 
person would have a l lowed $ 2 8 , 1 7 5 . 0 0 worth of e q u i t y t o have been 
encumbered by an $ 1 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 second mortgage, e s p e c i a l l y someone in 
Appe l lan t Theodore S a l a z a r ' s position who, when the i n i t i a l $28,175.00 
e q u i t y payment was due in June, 1981, was employed, had a part-time job, 
and had no unusual expenses creating an immediate mean for cash (T. Vol. 
1 1 / P. 4) . I f Respondent Davis had the Edwards' Quit Claim Deed when the 
Ci ty Consumer Services mortgage was executed, i t should have been dated and 
n o t a r i z e d back in June, 1981, so that i t could have been easi ly released 
and recorded i f the Edwards defaulted. The substantial evidence in the 
record corroborates Appellants' testimony regarding the transactions of May 
and June, 1 9 8 1 , and a l l reasonable inferences from said testimony verify 
A p p e l l a n t s ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Respondent Davis, while in the employ of 
Respondent Casper, breached h i s f i d u c i a r y duty to by allowing their 
$28,175.00 equity to be encumbered by the $11,000.00 City Consumer Services 
mortgage, contrary t o his representations and Appellants' understanding. 
The tr ia l court erred in concluding to the contrary. 
F u r t h e r , there was substantial evidence in the record supporting 
a f i n d i n g of breach of f i d u c i a r y duty as a result of Respondent Davis' 
f a i l u r e to disclose hc Appellants a l l of thr n^evant farM surr A mi I 
1
 i •4iiis.iL'1 AVI, , " "-lay dJid June, I'JMI , It .s uiidisputetl that subsequent \o 
t he e x e c u t i o n of t h e Uniform Real Estate Contract, on May 23, 1980, ~ne 
Edwards and Respondent f)avic. e»nl i*ml nnhi n SPI ]V nit* tr^nsart inn*-
p u r c h a s e oi three second t rus t deeds on vaiious properties (T. 'u'ol,, . 
4J I Hi pondent Davis conv inced t h e Edwards to invest approx'-'v-
? 7 i "IOO , 00 w h i r h Hiey I I V H J V H ] from I In v i I  M nf piopert. > iiiiiii II i II ill) i 
I I i II1,, I "i I ' I The sale proceeds could have been used by the Edwards *\c> 
pay -o f f A p p e l l a n t s " e q u i t y in teres t in June, I'lHIl,, but Responded ^ , v , s 
ir i-^presenfrtl that In m iiivestiiiejif «• H<N m h I „iii»lliil i lllii(iiiii,||lli i ih il re * t 
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Respondent Davis failed to indicate anything to the contrary. He admitted 
t h a t i t was r e a s o n b l e for Appellants to rely upon him to represent their 
b e s t i n t e r e s t s in a l l transactions. (T. Vol. I l l , Pp. 40-41). Respondent 
Davis 1 f a i l u r e t o d i sc lose the fu l l extent of his financial transactions 
wi th the Edwards was a breach of his fiduciary duty of fu l l disclosure. 
Had Respondent Davis fully disclosed his involvement with the Edwards, he 
could have a l e r t e d A p p e l l a n t s t o s ecure the advise of an independent 
counselor with regard to the sale of their home. Respondent Davis1 failure 
to ful ly disclose i s a breach of his fiduciary duty. 
Fur ther , Respondent Davis breached his fidicuary duty by fai l ing 
t o s e c u r e the removal of the Barkers f o l l o w i n g Applicants' repeated 
requests therefore. Appellants had no notice or knowledge that the Barkers 
had moved i n t o their heme (T. Vol. I , P. 39). The evidence i s undisputed 
t h a t a f t e r A p p e l l a n t s became aware of the Barkers1 occupancy, Respondent 
Davis promised to provide them with a lease-option contract (T. Vol. I , P. 
40) . He fa i l ed to do so until March, 1982, approximately s ix months after 
the Barkers moved i n , when he forwarded a proposed Uniform Real Estate 
Contract between the Barkers and Appellants (Exhibit No. 7 ) . Appellant 
Theodore Salazar thereupon contacted Respondent Davis and requested that he 
have the Barkers vacate the premises and recover the house (T. Vol. I I , P. 
4 4 ) ; however, i t took the a c t i o n of Plaintiffs-Appellants' counsel to 
secure the Barkers' removal (Exhibit Nos. 23 and 24). 
The t r i a l cour t found t h a t there was no need for Appellants' 
consent for the Barkers t o enter into their heme and real property, and 
t h a t Respondent Edwards owed Appellants no fiduciary duty with regard to 
the Barkers . This conclusion was in error. Even i f the Edwards were in 
l e g a l p o s s e s s i o n of the property when the Barkers moved in by virtue of 
A p p e l l a n t s ' Warranty Deed, the Edwards restored legal t i t l e to Appellants 
pursuant t o the Quit Claim Deed recorded on October 28, 1981. Respondent 
Dav i s ' cont inued involvement with Appellants' sale of their heme extended 
h i s p r i n c i p a l - a g e n c y r e l a t i o n s h i p with them, and the fiduciary duties 
a t t e n d a n t t h e r e t o . See P y l e s , supra. Subsequent to the recording of 
the Edwards' Quit Claim Deed, Respondent Davis' extended fiduciary duty to 
A p p e l l a n t s inc luded the duty t o forward to Appellants the lease-option 
agreement in accordance wi th h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , and obtaining the 
Barkers' removal from the residence promises upon Appellants' request. His 
f a i l u r e t o do so c o n s t i t u t e s a breach of his fiduciary duty to exercise 
reasonable s k i l l and d i l i g e n c e on behalf of Appellants. See Phi l l ips , 
supra. 
A p p e l l a n t s are entit led to a l l damages flowing frcm Respondent's 
b r e a c h of f i d u c i a r y d u t y . See Hopkins, supra; a l s o s e e Merkley 
v . McPherson's I n c . , 420 P.2d 205 (Wash. 1 9 6 6 ) . As the result of 
Respondent Davis' abuse of his fiduciary relationship with Appellants, the 
$ 1 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 City Consumer Serv ices mortgage was taken out against their 
e q u i t y i n t e r e s t , which Appellants were required to pay-off in the sum of 
$11,131.76. Further, as the result of Respondent Davis1 breach of his duty 
of l o y a l t y and t r u s t , Appellants were forced to pay $2,038.79 in monthly 
payments on the Ci ty Consumer Services mortgage, which they would never 
have had t o make but for Respondent Davis' actions. Further, Appellants 
l o s t $10,000.00 of equity in the home, which they would have realized frcm 
the r e - s a l e of the p r o p e r t y , had they not had to pay the City Consumer 
Services mortgage which was arranged for by Respondent Davis. 
The record of th i s action also supports an award of substantial 
p u n i t i v e damages, as a signal to real estate sales brokers and agents that 
conduct such as that engaged in by Respondent Davis w i l l not be tolerated. 
The t r i a l court's ruling on Appellants1 Seventh Claim for Relief should be 
remanded for e n t r y of Judgment in favor of Appellants and an appropriate 
award of general and punitive damages against Respondents Davis and Casper. 
5. THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
SUPPORTING APPELLANTS' CIAIM OF FRAUD AGAINST RESPONDENTS 
DAVIS, CftSPER AND EDWARDS. 
The t r i a l cour t concluded that there was "no evidence that any 
payment was due from Defendants Edwards on September 1, 1981, for the sum 
of $ 1 8 , 1 7 5 . 0 0 , " and t h e r e f o r e , Appellants1 claim that Respondent Davis 
misrepresented to than that the t i t l e to their property would be used only 
a s s e c u r i t y t o pay said sum, was without merit (See Conclusion of Law on 
P l a i n t i f f s 1 Eighth Claim for Relief, No. 1 ) . The tr ia l court therefore 
denied Appellants1 claim for fraud. 
As t h e d i s c u s s i o n , supra , p l a i n l y i n d i c a t e s , t h e r e was 
substant ia l evidence before the t r ia l court supporting Appellants' claim of 
f raud . Respondent Davis represented to Appellants that their $28,175.00 
e q u i t y would be used on ly t o s ecure payment of the $18,175.00 equity 
balance after the Edwards paid the i n i t i a l $10,000.00 amount (T. Vol. I , P. 
28) . Respondent Davis admitted discussing this proposal with Appellants 
(T. V o l . I I , P. 147). Further, Respondent Joel Edwards tes t i f ied that the 
whole purpose of the May, 1981, transactions between the parties was to 
g i v e them a d d i t i o n a l t ime p a s t June 1st to pay-off Appellants1 equity 
i n t e r e s t . The Extens ion Agreement of May 23, 1980, which provides that 
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payment of the $ 1 8 , 1 7 5 . 0 0 ba lance of A p p e l l a n t s 1 equity was due on 
September 1 , 1981, further corroborates the agreement. See discussion at 
Paragraph 4, supra. 
Respondent Davis misrepresented to Appellants that their equity 
would be used on ly as security for the $18,175.00 balance due to them on 
September 1 , 1 9 8 1 . In f a c t , Appellants1 ecjuity was used to secure the 
$ 1 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 City Consumer S e r v i c e s mortgage. The entire transaction, 
i n c l u d i n g the d i r e c t - w i r e bank deposit of $10,000.00, was structured in 
such a fashion so that Appellants would have np knowledge or notice of the 
second mortgage a g a i n s t t h e i r p r o p e r t y , and Respondent Davis in fact 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t unless he told Appellants about the City Consumer Services 
second mortgage, there would have been no other way for them to discover 
i t . 
Respondent Davis 1 f a l s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s were made under 
c ircumstances l i k e l y t o lead to deception. He had acted as Appellants' 
agent for the sa le of their property, and they had placed their trust and 
conf idence in him. Indeed , Respondent Davis t e s t i f i e & that i t was 
reasonable for A p p e l l a n t s t o r e l y upon him t o represent their best 
i n t e r e s t s in a l l of the transactions (T. Vol. I I , P. 41). In May, 1981, 
when Respondent Davis contacted Appellants to re-negotiate the pay-off of 
t h e i r e q u i t y i n t e r e s t , they had no reason to disbelieve or distrust him. 
He had p r e v i o u s l y negotiated the sale of their heme and the Edwards were, 
up t o t h a t p o i n t , performing in accordance with the Contract. Further, 
Respondent Davis failed to disclose any of his financial dealings with the 
Edwards subsequent to the execution of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (T. 
Vo l . I l l , P. 22). At the time of the negotiations in May, 1981, Respondent 
Davis had a List ing Agreement with the Edwards, which he did not disclose 
or o t h e r w i s e ver i fy with Appellants (T. Vol. I f P. 29) . As the result of 
h i s i n i t i a l agency r e l a t i o n s h i p wi th A p p e l l a n t s , and his continued 
involvement in the sale of their home, and his failure to disclose the fu l l 
e x t e n t of h i s involvement with the Edwards, Respondent Davis occupied a 
p o s i t i o n of trust and confidence with regard to Appellants, who reasonably 
believed that he was acting in their best interests (T. Vol. I , P. 29). 
A defendant commits actual fraud when the party with whan he i s 
dea l ing actually and reasonably re l ies upon his fa lse representations which 
are made under c i rcumstances l i k e l y to lead to deception. Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah, 1 9 8 5 ) . Respondent Davis made f a l s e 
representat ions to Appellants which induced them to convey away $28,175.00 
worth of e q u i t y in their home (See discussion, supra). Appellants would 
never have done so i f they knew their equity would be used to secure the 
$ 1 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 Ci ty Gonsumer Services loan (T. Vol. I , P. 30). By Respondent 
Davis 1 own a d m i s s i o n s , i t was reasonable for Appellants to rely upon him 
(T. Vol. I l l , P. 41), and under the circumstances, his representations were 
l i k e l y to lead to deception because Respondent Davis occupied a position of 
t r u s t , l o y a l t y and c o n f i d e n c e with Appellants, and had failed to ful ly 
disclose his transactions and dealings with the Edwards. 
As the result of Respondent Davis' fraudulent misrepresentations, 
P l a i n t i f f s were required to pay $2,038.79 in monthly City Consumer Services 
mortgage payments, which they would never had been required to pay but for 
Respondent Davis1 acts . Further, they were required to pay $11,131.76 to 
pay -o f f on the City Consumer Services mortgage, which would have never had 
been incurred but for Respondent Davis' involvement in this transaction. 
F i n a l l y , Appellants were denied $10,000.00 of equity in their hone as the 
r e s u l t of Respondent Dav i s ' a c t s , s i n c e they had to pay-off the City 
Consumer Services mortgage on the re-sale of their residence. 
S ince Respondent Davis 1 rpresentations were made during May, 
1 9 8 1 , w h i l e he was s t i l l in the employ of Respondent Casper, and while he 
was acting within the scope and course of his employment, Respondent Casper 
i s l i a b l e for his fraud under the doctrine of "respondeat superior". Where 
a broker clothes an agent with power to s e l l property, and sends the agent 
f o r t h t o induce persons to enter into transactions regarding property, the 
p r i n c i p a l i s bound by any misrepresentations which the agent might make 
concerning the property. Stuck v. Delta Land & Water Co., 63 U. 495, 227 
P. 791 (1924); also see Phi l l ips , supra. 
Further , when Respondent Davis made his misrepresentations, he 
was engaged as the sales agent for Respondents Edwards (Defendants1 t r ia l 
Exh ib i t No. 3 3 ) . S ince Respondent Davis1 misrepresentations were made 
w i t h i n the scope and course of his employment as agent for the Edwards, 
they are l iable for his fraud. See Stuck, and Phi l l ips , supra. 
The Judgment of the tr ia l court on Appellants' claims for fraud 
a g a i n s t Respondents Davis, Casper and Edwards should be reversed and this 
matter should be remanded for entry of Judgment in favor of Appellants on 
s a i d c l a i m s , with instructions to award Appellants their damages resulting 
from Respondent Dav i s ' m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s as described hereinabove, 
together with an appropriate, substantial award of punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
When A p p e l l a n t s entered i n t o the L i s t i n g Agreement with 
Respondents Davis and Casper for the sale of their heme in November, 1979, 
little did they know that almost 10 years later, they would still be 
struggling with that sale. Pursuant to the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
with Respondents Edwards, Appellants were entitled to $28,175.00, as and 
for their equity interest in their home. While the time for payment of 
that sum may have been modified by the parties, it was still due and 
payable. Appellants had never waived their right to payment of their full 
equity interest. Any oral modification of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
between the Salazars and the Edwards, and the Extension Agreement of May, 
1981, were sufficiently performed to bind the parties thereto. Appellants 
are entitled to their damages resulting from the Edwards' breach of the 
agreements • 
Appellants are also entitled to their treble damages resulting 
from the waste committed to their property subsequent to the execution of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract. Respondents Barkers may properly be held 
accountable for said waste as licensees of the premises. 
Respondents Davis and Casper owed Appellants a fiduciary duty to 
act with trust, loyalty and confidence with regard to the sale of their 
property. That duty did not terminate with the closing of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, because Respondent Edwards continued to interject himself 
into the completion of that sales contract. Respondent Davis is liable for 
breach of his fiduciary duties in misrepresenting to Appellants the terms 
of the Estension Agreement of May, 1981, and in failing to fully disclose 
the full extent of his financial dealings with the Edwards. He is also 
liable for fraud and misrepresentation. Since Respondent Davis1 actions 
were committed during the scope and course of his employment with 
Respondents Casper and Edwards, they may also be held accountable for his 
actions. 
For these reasons, Appellants respectfully request that this 
Honorable Court reverse the Judgment entered by the trial court and remand 
this case for entry of Judgment in favor of Appellants as hereinabove set 
forth. 
DATED this day of January, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GALLEQOS & SCIUMBATO 
By: ^dlCUL J A V IjL^M 
Michael R. Sci6mbato 
Attorney for Appellants 
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EXHIBIT A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THEODORE B. SALAZAR and : 
GENEVIEVE SALAZAR, his wife 
: 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. : 
JOEL EDWARDS and LAWANNA : 
EDWARDS, ET AL, 
: 
Defendants. 
Trial of the above captioned matter came on before this 
Court with representation by Michael R. Sciumbato, Esq. for 
plaintiffs, Arthur Lee Bishop, ill, Esq. for Davis and Casper and 
John E. Cawley, Esq. for Barker and Joel and Lawanna Edwards 
appearing pro se. The Court after hearing arguments of counsel, 
receiving closing arguments in writing, then addressed the 
litigants requesting that they respond to the Court's order 
closing arguments rather than submitting long complicated 
Memorandums of Points and Authority by way of a post trial brief 
to which response the lawyers again responded in writing and the 
Court after having received all of these documents, reviewed all 
the evidence, exhibits that were offered and accepted at the time 
of trial now makes and enters its Memorandum Decision as follows. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C 83-7169 
SALAZAR, ET UX V. 
EDWARDS, ET AL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
For purposes of simplifying this memorandum decision the 
Court is repeating in a capsulized form the facts as adduced from 
the evidence presented so as to clarify the direct response by 
this Court to the issues requiring determination. 
The facts indicate that the plaintiffs sold their home to 
defendants Edwards May 23, 1980 for $59,900, with a balloon 
payment due June 1, 1981 in the amount of $28,175. On May 20, 
1981 and before the due date of the balloon payment plaintiffs 
conveyed by warranty deed their interest in the property to 
defendants Edwards. On May 20, 1981 an agreement was made but 
not signed whereby Edwards would pay plaintiffs $18,175, plus 13 
percent interest due on September 1, 1981 and this is supported 
by Exhibit P-6. On June 8, 1981 defendant Edwards borrowed 
$11,000 from City Consumer Services, Inc. on the property. On 
June 12, 1981 plaintiffs received by wire directly into their 
checking account $10,000. On October 1, 1981 defendants Edwards 
entered into a contract to sell said property to defendants 
Barker for $55,700. On October 7, 1981 defendants Edwards quit 
claimed their interest in the property back to the plaintiffs. 
On August 8, 1983 defendants Barker quit claimed their property 
interest to said property back to the plaintiffs. On August 31, 
1984, plaintiffs sold their home for $63,000. 
The plaintiffs1 claim for relief for breach of contract 
claimed to have occurred by defendants Joel and Lawanna Edwards 
is that as a result of the transactions of May 23, 1980 in which 
SALAZAR, ETUXV. 
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plaintiffs entered into a contract to sell their real property to 
defendants and whereby defendants Edwards agreed in return to pay 
$59,900 for the property with a $4,500 down payment and $287 per 
month until June 1, 1981 set the stage for this claim. Then 
either on or before this date defendants agreed to pay plaintiffs 
$28,175 for the plaintiffs1 equity in the property, then again on 
May 20, 1981 the plaintiffs conveyed a warranty deed for said 
property to the defendants Edwards and on June 8, 1981 defendant 
Edwards borrowed $11,000 against the property and $10,000 was 
placed directly into the plaintiffs9 checking account as indi-
cated in the Statement of Facts and the Edwards continued to pay 
and first and second mortgages until September 1981. In all of 
these transactions plaintiffs waived their rights to insist upon 
full performance by defendants as originally contemplated due 
June 1, 1981 and for payments of the amount of the $28,175. The 
excuse of condition by waiver as pointed out in the Restatement 
of Contracts First at Sections 297 and 298 are claimed and also 
an excuse of condition by acceptance of part performance as found 
in Restatement First of Contracts 299 have all been carefully 
reviewed by the Court in making the determination herein 
specified. Furthermore, the Court took into consideration the 
fact that defendants Edwards recorded the quit claim deed and 
thereby by doing so surrendered possession, gave delivery and at 
least inquiry notice to the plaintiffs in terminating their 
contract as required and allowed under Utah Law Code Annotated, 
SALAZAR, ET UX V. 
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Title 57-1-6 thru 13. The Court finds that there was no material 
breach of contract by defendants Edwards and based on the facts 
adduced from the evidence presented, the Court finds that the 
first claim for relief, that is breach of contract by defendants 
Joel and Lawanna Edwards, should be and the same is hereby 
denied. 
Plaintiffs claim in their second claim for relief, the 
breach of a promissory note agreement wherein they say that 
defendants Edwards owe the obligation as a result of this note. 
The facts clearly indicate that the note was never signed and 
that there in fact exists a dispute as to which the note 
represents. Because of its indefiniteness, because it was not 
signed, it is barred by the Statute of Frauds and is an unforce-
able agreement clearly covered under Utah Code Title 25-5-1 thru 
3. Therefore, the plaintiffs1 second claim for relief, the 
breach of a promissory note agreement should be and the same is 
hereby denied. 
The plaintiffs1 claim in their third claim for relief again 
is a breach of contract and again the Statute of Frauds require 
that such agreement be in writing and signed as found in the 
heretofore mentioned sections. Inasmuch as this was not done, 
equity should not construct and will not construct an agreement 
when there is not sufficient proof as to what the alleged 
agreement represents. This Court finds that plaintiffs failed to 
sustain their burden in establishing what the agreement repre-
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sents andtherefore for that reason the third claim for relief of 
the plaintiffs is denied. 
Plaintiffs1 claim for relief by their fourth claim of waste 
by the defendants alleges that the defendants committed waste or 
at the very least that they were in legal possession of the 
property when waste was in fact committed on the property. The 
Court finds that the plaintiffs failed to prove their alleged 
repair costs and were not able to sustain the burden of showing 
that there was exclusive possession by the defendants and that 
the waste which they allege showed any dimunition of the property 
value and for those reasons the claim for relief on the grounds 
of waste alleged to have been committed by the defendants Edwards 
is denied. 
The fifth claim for relief on fraudulent misrepresentation 
by defendants Edwards on condition concerning the payment of the 
$28,175 payment due on June 1, 1981, this Court finds was waived 
by the plaintiffs for reasons already indicated in this Memoran-
dum Decision in the plaintiff's first claim. To allow the 
plaintiffs to collect the $28,175 and retain defendants Edwards 
real property rights to the property would be a clear unjust 
enrichment to the plaintiffs and for that reason this claim is 
without merit and should be denied as is the sixth claim for 
relief for fraudulent misrepresentation by defendants Edwards on 
the grounds that it does not have any merit and the same ia also 
denied. 
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The plaintiff's seventh claim for relief for breach of 
fiduciary duty, this Court has carefully analyzed, and has found 
that this relief based upon breach of fidicuary duty by defen-
dants Davis and Casper is not supportable by the evidence and 
testimony or the analysis of the lav and the same is hereby 
denied. Defendants Davis and Casper fulfilled their obligation 
under the sales agency agreement with the plaintiffs and the 
plaintiffs' allegation that the $10,000 due on June 1, 1981 and 
the $18,175 due on September 1, 1981 are both without merit. The 
plaintiffs' allegations of how the warranty deed was to be used 
exclusively in a prescribed manner was not proven at the time of 
trial and further that the plaintiffs' allegations that defen-
dants Davis and Casper were representing them on or about 
September 1, 1981 and on or about October 1, 1981, is also 
without merit. Defendants Edwards were in legal possession of 
the property on September 1, 1981 and entered into a legal 
contract for the sale of the property on October 1, 1981 with 
defendants Barker. Therefore, there was no need for consent by 
the plaintiffs for Barkers to enter into said property and there 
was no fidicuary duty owed by defendants Davis and Casper to the 
plaintiffs and this is clearly spelled out under Utah Code Title 
22-1-1. 
Plaintiffs' eighth claim for relief on the grounds of 
fradulent misrepresentations by defendants Davis and Casper is 
also denied and again there is no evidence of any payment due on 
SALAZAR, ET UX V. 
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September 1, 1981 for the amount of $18,175 by defendants 
Edwards. There could be no misrepresentation by defendants Davis 
and Casper as far as the alleged payment is concerned unless 
there is proof of the payment which establishes by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that it is due. 
The plaintiffs' ninth claim for relief has already been 
addressed by this Court and of course is denied for the same 
reasons• 
Based on the foregoing analysis the claim by the plaintiffs 
is dismissed with prejudice. All parties to bear their propor-
tionate share of costs of court and attorney's fees. Mr. Cawley 
is requested to prepare the appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Decree not inconsistent with the findings of 
this Memorandum Decision and submit the same to other counsel as 
required under Rule 2.9 and then to this Court entry. 
Dated this // day of June, 198$. 
DAVID B. DEE, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Copies nailed to counsel. 
EXHIBIT B 
MICHAEL R. SCEUMBATO, #2894 
JOSEPH H. GALLEGOS, #1143 
GALLEGOS & SCIUMBATO 
Attorneys for P la in t i f f s 
333 South Denver Street 
Salt. Lake City , Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-6522 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE CO0NTYr STATE OF UTAH 
THEODORE B. SALAZAR and 
GENEVIEVE SALAZAR, h i s wi fe , * 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs . : 
s 
JOEL EDWARDS and LAWANNA F. : 
EDWARDS, his wife, JO VANCE : 
CASPER, d/b/a CENTURY 21-CASPER ; 
AND COMPANY, SID DAVIS, individually : 
and as agent and employee of JO : 
VANCE CASPER d/b/a CENTURY 21-CASPER : 
AND COMPANY, and HAL D. BARKER and : 
MYRNA M. BARKER, his wife, i 
Defendants. : 
The above-entitled natter cane on for tr ia l on January 6 through 
8 , 1986 , be fore the Honorable David B. Dee, D i s t r i c t Court Judge, 
p r e s i d i n g ; Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel of record, Michael 
R. Sciumbato, of the law fir.n of GALLEQOS & SCIUMBATO; Defendants Joel 
Edwards and LaWanna F. Edwards were present and represented themselves Pro 
Se ; Defendants Jo Vance Casper and Sid Davis were present and represented 
by t h e i r counse l of record, Arthur. Lee Bishop, I I I , Attorney at Law; and 
Defendants Hal D. Barker and Mryna M. Barker were present and represented 
by t h e i r counsel of record, Johr. E. Cawley, Attorney at Law; and the 
p a r t i e s having c a l l e d w i t n e s s e s who wv»ce sworn and t e s t i f i e d , and 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
C i v i l No. C-83-7169 
Hon-j cable David B . Dee 
having proffered into evidence certain exhibits; and the Court having heard 
and argument of counsel and having received closing arguments in writing, 
and having reviewed a l l of the evidence and exhibits, and having entered 
i t s Memorandum Decision on the 11th day of June, 1986, and based thereon 
and good cause appearing therefore, the Court now hereby nakes and enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. P l a i n t i f f s are ac tua l and bona f i d e residents of Clark 
County, S t a t e of Nevada and they were, at the time of the acts complained 
of by them herein, the owners of real property which i s the subject of this 
a c t i o n , which r e a l property i s located entirely within Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
2 . Defendants Joel Edwards and LaWanna F. Edwards were, at the 
time of the a c t s complained of by P l a i n t i f f s , residents of salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. They are now aesidentsof the State of Idaho. 
3 . Defendant Jo Vance C&sper d/b/a Century 21-Casper & Company 
was , at: the time of the acts complained of by Plaintiffs , a real estate 
broker , engaged in the selling of real property, licensed to do business 
and doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. Defendant Sid Davis vas, at the time of acts complained cf 
by P l a i n t i f f s , a real estate salesman, licensed by the State of Utah. On 
May 2 3 , 1980, he was employed as a real estate salesman and agent for 
Defendant Jo Vance Casper d/b/a Century 21-Casper and Company. 
5. Defendants Hal D. Barker and Myrna M. Barker were, at the 
t ime of the a c t s complained of by P l a i n t i f f s , residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
6. On May 2 3 , 1980, Pla int i f f s were the owners of a norre and 
r e a l property loca ted at 3275 South 4300 West, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
7. On May 2 3 , 1980, P l a i n t i f f s entered into a Uniform Real 
E s t a t e Contract for the sale of their hone and real property to Defendants 
J o e l and LaWanna Edwards* The purchase p r i c e for the home and real 
property was $59 ,900*00, payable as follows: $4,500.00 paid on May 23, 
1980/ thereafter, Defendants would pay the monthly mortgage payments owing 
on the home and real property in the*sum of $287*00 per month until June 1, 
1 9 8 1 , a t which time Defendants would pay a balloon payment as and for the 
balance of Plaintiffs' equity in the sum of $28,175.00. 
8. On May 2 0 , 1 9 8 1 , an a g r e e m e n t in the form of a 
Promissory/Trust Deed Note, was prepared, but not signed by Plaintiffs or 
Defendants Edwards. Pursuant t o sa id Promissory/Trust Deed Note, 
Defendants Edwards were t o pay Plaintiffs $18,175.00, together with 13% 
i n t e r e s t thereon, on September 1, IS81. This i s supported by Exhibit P-6. 
Further, on May 20, 1981, and before the date the balloon payment under the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract mas due, Plaintiffs conveyed by warranty deed 
their interest in their home and real property to Defendants Edwards. 
9* On June 8, 1981, Defendants Edwards borrowed $11,000.00 from 
C i t y Consumer Services, Inc., using the equity interest in Plaintiffs9 home 
and real property as security therefore. 
10* On June 12 , 1981, Plaintiffs received by wire direcMy Into 
their checking account the sum of $10,000.00. 
11. On October 1 , 1981
 r Defendants Edwards entered into a 
c o n t r a c t t o s e l l Pla int i f fs 1 home end real property to Defendants Hal D. 
3arker and Myrna M. Barker for the sum of $55,700.00. 
12. On October 7 , 1981 , Defendants Edwards conveyed, by Quit 
Claim Deed, t h e i r i n t e r e s t in the home and r e a l property back to 
Plaint i f fs . 
13. On August 8 , 1983, Defendants Barkers conveyed their 
interest in the home and real proeprty to Plaintiffs by Quit Claim Deed. 
14. On August 3 1 , 1984, Plaintiffs re-sold tneir home and real 
property to a third-party buyer for the sum of $63,000.00. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now hereby makes 
and enters the following: 
(PNMJSIOI& OF LAW 
FIRST QAIM FOB BELIEF 
BREACH OF CONTRACT - DEFENDANTS EDWARDS 
1 . As a result of the transactions occurring between Plaintiffs 
and Defendants Edward between Hay 23, 19Q0, until September, 1981, as 
hereinabove-described, Plaintiffs waived their rights to insist upon ful l 
performance of the Uniform Real Estate Contract by Defendants Edwards as 
o r i g i n a l l y contemplated due June 1, 1981, and for payment of the balloon 
payment in the sum of $28,175.00. 
2 . By accepting partial performance of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract and the other transactions between the parties as hereinabove set 
f o r t h , Defendants Edwards are e n t i t l e d t o the defense of excuse of 
condit ion by acceptance of part perfcnoanoe as set forth in U:** Restated! v 
First of Contracts/ Section 299 • 
3 . By recording the Quit Claim Deed to Plaint i f fs , Defendants 
Edwards surrendered possession of the home and real property, gave delivery 
and a t l e a s t inquiry n o t i c e t o P l a i n t i f f s of their termination of the 
Uniform Real Estate Oontract as required and allowed under Utah Code Ann* 
Section 57-1-6 through 13. 
4 . There was no m a t e r i a l breach of contract by Defendants 
Edwards and accordingly, Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief, for breach of 
oontract by Defendants Edwards, shall be denied. 
SBOOND OAIM FOR RELIEF 
BKE&QB OF PROMISSORY NOTE - DBFEMDAWTS EDWARDS 
1 . The Promissory/Trust Deed Note of Hay 20, 1981, between 
P l a i n t i f f s and Defendants Edwards, was not signed and therefore, there i s a 
dispute as to what agreement the alleered note represents. 
2 . S ince the Promissory/Trust Deed Note was net signed, i t i s 
i n d e f i n i t e and P l a i n t i f f s are barred from recovering thereunder by the 
statute of frauds. 
3 . The Promissory/Trust Deed Note i s unenforceable under the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 25-5-1 through 3 . 
4 . P l a i n t i f f s 9 Second Claim f o r R e l i e f , for breach of the 
Proraissory/^Trust Deed Note by Defendants Edwards, shall be denied. 
THIRD OAIM FOR RELIEF 
BREACH OF AGREBfiEHT OF MRS 20, 1981 - DEFENDANTS EDWARDS 
1 . 1'he a l l e g e d Agreement of Hay 20, 1981, was not signed by 
Defendants Edwards, and there fore , i s unenforceable against Defendants 
Edwards under the statute of frauds. 
2. Equity should not and will not contract an agreement between 
the p a r t i e s when there i s i n s u f f i c i e n t proof as to what the alleged 
agreement was. 
3 . P l a i n t i f f s hasre t a i l e d t o meet t h e i r burden in a 
e s t a b l i s h i n g what the agreement of May 20 , 1981, was and therefore, 
P l a i n t i f f s 9 Third Claim for Relief against Defendants Edwards, for breach 
of the alleged agreement of May 20, 1)81
 f s h a l l b e d e n i e d . 
FOQRTH CLAIM FDR RELIEF 
WftSTE - DEFENDiVNTS EDWARDS 
1. P l a i n t i f f s f a i l e d t o prove their alleged repair costs for 
the repair of damage to their home and real property* 
2 . P l a i n t i f f s f a i l e d t o s u s t a i n t h e i r burden of showing 
e x c l u s i v e occupancy and p o s s e s s i o n of their home and real property by 
Defendants Edwards during the period they allege the waste they complain of 
was to have occurred. 
3 . P l a i n t i f f s have failed to meet their burden in establishing 
t h a t the waste of which they complain caused any diminution in the value of 
the real property. 
4. P l a i n t i f f s 1 Fourth Claim for Re l ie f against Defendants 
Edwards, for w&ste, shall be denied. 
FIFTH CLAIM TOR REEJJSF 
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION - DEJ^ ENDANTS EDWARDS 
1« The condi t ion that Defendants Edwards pay Plaintiffs the 
ba lance of their $28,175.00 equity in their home and real property by June 
If 1983, as required under the Uniform Real Estate Contract between the 
parties *as waived by Plaintiffs. 
2. To a l l o w P l a i n t i f f s to c o l l e c t the $28 ,175 .00 from 
Defendants Edwards under the Uniform Real Estate Contract between the 
p a r t i e s , and retain Defendants Edwards1 real property rights in and to the 
property would be an unjust enrichment to Plaintiffs . 
3 . P l a i n t i f f s ' F i f t h O.use of Act ion a g a i n s t Defendants 
Edwards, f o r fraudulent misrepresentation, i s without merit and shall be 
denied. 
SIXm OATM TOR RSLIEF 
ERADULENT MISREPRESENTATION - DEFENDANTS EDWARDS 
1. P l a i n t i f f s failed to meet their burden in establishing what 
the agreement of Nay 20, 1983, between the a{rties was. 
2 . P l a i n t i f f s S i x t h Claim for R e l i e f a g a i n s t Defendants 
Edwards, for fraudulent misrepresentation based upon1 the said agreement of 
May 20, 1983, i s without merit and shall be denied. 
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RET^ TF 
BREACH OF EEDOCIARy DOTif - DEPENDRNTS CftSPER AFP DAVJS 
1 . Defendants Davi? and Casper fulf i l led their obligations to 
P l a i n t i f f s under the s a l e s agency ( l i s t i n g ) agreement by finding and 
securing for Plaintiffs a ready, willing and able buyer of Plaintiffs1 home 
and real property. 
2* P l a i n t i f f s have f a i l e d to prove by a preponderence of the 
evidence their allegation that they conveyed their equity interest in their 
home and real property to Defendants Edwards, at the instance and behest of 
Defendant Davis, upon the representation of Defendant Davis that Plaintiffs 
would be paid $10,000.00 for their equity on or before June 1, 1981, ;m& 
the balance of their equity would be used to secure a mortgage for payment 
of the $18,175.00 balance of their equity. 
3. P l a i n t i f f s ' cleims that Defendant Davis allowed Defendants 
Barkers t o take possession of Plaintiffs' home and reaJ property without 
P l a i n t i f f s ' consent and f a i l e d and refused to secure the removal of 
Defendants Barkers fol lowing Plaintiffs' requests therefore are without 
m e r i t . Defendants Edwards were in legal possession of the property on 
September 1 , 1981 , and altered into a legal contract for the sale of the 
property with Defendants Barkers on October 1, 1981. Accordingly, there 
was no need for consent by Plain d f f s for the Barkers to enter into the 
home and real property, and there was no fiduciary duty owed by Defendants 
Davis and Qreper to Plaintiffs pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 22-1-1. 
4 . P l a i n t i f f s 9 Seventh Claim for Relief against Hirendants 
Davis and Casper, for breach of fiduciary duty, shall be denied. 
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION - DEFENDANTS DAVIS AND CASPER 
• • I • • — — ' I I I I I 111 II I I II I I I 1 1 1 ! I I I I ! I! I 
1 . S ince there i s no evidence that any payment was due from 
Defendants Edwards on September 1 , 1981, for the sum of $18,175.00, 
P l a i n t i f f s 1 c la ims aga ins t Defendants Davis and Casper, that they 
f r a u d u l e n t l y misrepresented to Plaintiffs that Plaintiffs1 t i t l e to their 
property would be used only as security to pay Plaintiffs said sum are 
without merit. 
2 . P l a i n t i f f s ' Eighth Claim for Re l i e f against Davis and 
Casper, for fraudulent misrepresentation, shall be denied. 
ut 
KENIH CLAIM ?%)R RELIEF 
WASTE - DEFENDANTS BARKERS 
1. For the reasons set f^rth in the Conclusions on Plaintiffs1 
Fourth Claim for Relief, above, Plaintiffs" Ninth Claim for Relief against 
Defendants Hal and Myrna Barker, for waste, shall be denied. 
Judgment s h a l l enter d i s m i s s i n g Plaintiffs Complaint and the 
Causes of Act ion s e t for th t h e r e i n , and Defendants' Counterclaim and 
Cross-Claims, with prejudice, a l l parties to bear their proportionate share 
of costs of Court and attorney's fees. 
DRIED this day of , 1987 • 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
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c o r r e c t copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
postage prepaid on this //Yf] day of March, 1987, to the following: 
JcaL and LaWanna Edwards 
5W5 Galena 
Chubbuck, Idaho 83202 
John Cawley, Esq. 
Attorney at La* 
56 East Broadway, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 64111 
Arthur Lee Bishop, Esq* 
Attorney at Law 
350 South 400 East, #203 / ^ . 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 / / \ 
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"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDERSTOOD. SEEK COMPETENT ADVICL." E X H I B I T D 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
A. THIS ACUUttMENT, made in duplicate this ?3 ffl day of May _ , A. D., IVJill , 
by and botwocn _ 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and CfOOl E d W a r d g a n d LnWanna V» K d w a r d C , h i f l V/ii'd , 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of 3 ? 7 5 ffWItrfl 4 30Q WfLT: u 
2. WITNKSSKTI1 s That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell arid convoy to tho buyer, 
and the buyer tor tho consideration herein uientioned agrees to purchase tho following described real property, situate in 
th. county *t S a l f e TUftUu
 stMtm ^ Utoh> ^ . ^ t , 3 2 7 5 S o u t h 4 3 0 0 Woat 
APPWCTt 
More particularly described an follows: 
Beginning South 89 Dog. 57 Min. West 1769.61 feet and North 
0 dog. 06 min. West 1422*09 feet from the Southeast corner 
of section 30, T. 1 S.# R. 3 W. , SLM, and running thence 
South 09 dog. 57 rain. West 192.50 foot to the l*ast line of 
4300 West street; thence North 0 dog. 06 win. VJost 05 feet; 
thence North 09 dog.57 mln. Cast 192.50 feet; thence South 
0 deg. 06 rain. Bast 05 feet to boginning. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter Into possession and pay for said described premises tho sum of 
F i f t y — n i n e t h o u s a n d n i n e h u n d r e d dollars--—-»—«-»-—-»- Dollars {* ^ ^ * 9 0 0 . 00
 } 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order ' 
.trictiy within th. following Urn-, to-wit; P o u r t h o u s a n d d o l l a r g and 5 0 0 , 0 0
 ( , 4 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 } 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ 5 « > f 4 0 0 » 0 0 shall bo paid as follows: 
Buyers agree to pay tho monthly payments on the existing mortgage to 
Prudential Federal Savings in the amount of $207.00 until June 1, 1901 
at which time tho Buyer will pay off the balance of tho Sellers equity 
of $28i175.00 through refinance or assumption of existing loan* 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer or the if**: day of J u n c , 19 °° 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from * on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of per cent ( , —£12—% > per annum. The Buyor, at his option at anytime, 
nay pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitation* of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to oe applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Uuyw on this contract less than accorditig 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doinif, it will in no way alter the terms of tho contract us to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other VQmwiiuu of the seller. 
G. It is understood that there presently exists an oblig 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan 
,  ation against said property in favor of . 
_-_-_ - , - » - . • „, + m r*n n. with an unpaid balance of 
27 ,225 .OR)
 # J u n e 1 , 19XTD as of. 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
None 
erty, except the following , , 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed tiie 
Ton 
vhen unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at tho rote of not to exceed percent { .%) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provi*;«»d that the ngrrvgate mouldy inMalfniviU 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater ttu.a each installment miyment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
said obligations are assumed: or approved by buyor. 
10. The Buyer agrees uj>on written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above meuUouod, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half tho expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments uud 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may bo assessed 
and which may oecomo due on these premises during the life of this 'agreement. The ScMcr hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises oxeert tho following: 
None 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the payment of has obligations against said properly. 
12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after . s7wnc l, l.frsa 
13. The Buyer further afrrees to keep all Insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $ 5u-» 0 0 0 * 0 0 
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may appear and to deliver the insurance policy to nim. 
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance-
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may. at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premium** or either 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advunced 
and raid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of % of one percent per 
muuUi until paid. 
lu. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition. 
1G. In the event of a failure to comply with the te: ma hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies: 
f j f t ieCli. days thereafter, the 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of "the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer* shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and iinpruvi'inoiiU shall remain with 
the land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, sno proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the iaw» of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of * receiver to take possession of saio mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues und 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the paymont of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court: and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue u^uiiist thu 
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, bay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments heroin reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agreej to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premises treo and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may huvo accrued 
by or through the acta or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abrtract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto — 
None 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including, a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. 
censors, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said purtios to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year 
first abovo w^tton. \ Signed iiktju^ presence <^ f > 
I. It^is-uoderstood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrate! A, HUC-
I and assigns^ of the respective parties hereto. 
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I ;i ».:u ,1'j/IW ml uth i •• I .»I . • I u • l» 1 .* convidoi.it ion - - ^ in..w. i, 
l lu i'«nr.vlmr U?V;MHVJ t"acl of l::u f lit S J I I Uil v Cuinuy, 
Ul'UIIdirii; tjoulli 5J9VW l/t -l 1 / J V . O I IVI-I jnd North UtfOV Wvyt I.V.WU9 I. -I 
I I'CIH llu» JuuilrMsl cur.ivi* ut J f I IUII JU, To«/ir,htp I South r tu_.' I \U'A n i l 
*Mil:a MurLdlait, and running Ili *!!•-• t» youth Wr)7* Wcat 192.bO f /ot to tu» j; m 
U n e ol 4'JOO U-Mt S t r e e t ; eiiuM'j,* North 0*06' West 85 fuet; tbtftieu North o9w 
37* East 192*50 fi*et; tlii'iti't* Joutb 0*0V lio«t d5 reet to boi'Inning. 
SubjfiiL to uvvd ol TLU»1 in tlu» or ig ina l principal sum ol 9?U,U00.0U betuyt-u 
Theodore U. Snlasar and 0 ni»vl »vo Saiasar , hi* w i f e , ;t«* Trustor, Prudential 
PodurnJ SavLnr,*? and Loan A;vccJ*Ttlonv as Trustee miu Benei Ic iury, Ual'd Muvcmbi \ 
9, 1976, recordt'd Hove«rtK»r !U, 19/6, Ln Uook. 4 )99 , P:\\>,v 21U, as Ijoeu'-KMU Jo. 
?<J7V)!4, reeordu ol Jail l*it e County, U.uh, thi* grantve herein Junius and 
J ; : U T « lo pov, 
'Jubjeet to /urrent general lti"«,»s, vjyementu, r e s t r i c t i o n s , and rjrhts oi 
I.MV oi tovoid oi fill on* v 11» I • • iii l r.t oi e»|ui'. y. 
./IVSIKo?;, thi ' lmd of snid irmitor , this ?U duy of 
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DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOIU: Wlion paid, (his nolo, wilh Iruvl Dued iweuri.i'j *«#,,«, 
lo Trv*lvo (ur curicwllutioti, bofor* lucoiwoyonco will bu modo. 
EXHIBIT F 
c i»i' \ t L o : \J 11 u J , J o i u •. 
t 10
 f . i; /5. .oo# ...SuJ i, j, .-it\i\ (;i i y , Ui.,iii 
. .M»y. ; :M# iiK 
l ;01i VAl.Utf JUiOUVhl >, die undei*ij:#icd, jointly and svwudJy, |i»u<m.i' to p.iy iu the order u/ 
TUrcODQKtf » . SATJV7.AU AND GKNL'V lliVK JJALAZAU, l i l i i w i l e 
E i g h t e e n T h o u s a n d One Hundred S o v u n t y f i v c and N o . 1 0 0 — ~ — - — J b . J / ' ^ . u o 
iJOJJ.AIlb u >, 
together widj interne from dace ac the race of. Tiii.ir.Locn 
die unpaid pctncipaJ, said piincipal and interest payable at follow-. 
.per lent ( 1 !*'/<>) pc-r annua 
Eighteen Thousand Onu Hundred Seventy Kivo and No/JOO Dollar:; (vlii, I/^.HIJ) 
plus XnturoiiC due and payable Jn full on or before luy U'».HK'r 1, I Vol. 
l:ach payment shall be applied firsl *o accrued iiitesest ami die halaiuc to On n-uuiuiin ol puiK.p.d. Any 
such installment not paid when due ^Jiall bear interest thereafter at the tau of .;t., 
cent ( c/c) per annum until paid. 
l( default oicuts in die payment of laid installments of primipal and iiiictcti ur any patt dieicul, ui in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed seeming this note, die holder hcteof, at its 
option and widiout notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balaiuc *nnl accnud iiiu-ie&i due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after dciauU in die payment of pi^mpal or inteicM. eahci with 
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, u«;rec tu pay all insts and expenses oi loHetimti io.lu.lmi! 
a reasonable attorney's lee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof seveially waive pietcntmeot I'm p.ty:.-. ;;, dwnaud 
and notice of dishonor M\%1 nonpayment of this note, and consent to a.i;» .md all exUimonv of dim, leucw.tL, 
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with icspect lo die payment oi uiher' i.to-
visions of this note, and to the telease of *n%y swcuihy, oi .my patt theieof, with oi w idiom MI!/ n u m m 
'litis note is secured by a Tiust Deed \,i even dale he;cwilh. 
J51SG1NNING S o u t h 8 9 ° 5 7 T West 3 7 6 9 , 6 1 LV.et and N o r t h 
0 f u 6 " Went 1 4 2 2 . 8 9 f e e t from t h e S o u t h e a s t c o r n e r o f 
S e c t i o n 3 0 , T o w n s h i p 1 U o u l h , Kauge 1 l / e u t , H a l t h a k e 
M e r i d i a n , and r u n n i n g t h e n c e S o u t h 8 9 * 5 7 ' We a t i 9 ^ . 5 0 
f e e t t o t h e ' i a a t l i n e o f 4 3 0 0 Wcat S t r e e t ; t h e n c e 
N o r t h O^OO1 W e s t 8 5 f e e t ; t h e n c e N o r t h 8 9 ° 5 7 ' J o e l iCd^irda 
Kaar 1 9 2 . 5 0 f e e t ; i h e u r e Ihitilh U v 0 0 ' KaaL l>5 
l o o t t o b o u J a m l n u * • .. .. 
ha\/antiii K, iCdwardti 
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